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REVITALIZING ESSENTIAL FACILITIES
BRETr FRISCHMANN*
SPENCER WEBER WALLER**

I. INTRODUCTION
There is a vigorous debate concerning the merits of private control
over various types of resources. Treating something as private property
grants the property holder the right to exclude others or to grant them
access on differing terms. Treating something as an open access commons conversely welcomes all users on a nondiscriminatory basis. The
battle over which regime best serves society's interests exists in numerous areas of the law, including intellectual property, regulated industries, and antitrust. It is also currently in vogue to "propertize," privatize,
and deregulate legal regimes under a variety of rationales all connected
with maximizing wealth, supporting price discrimination, promoting allocative efficiency, and internalizing externalities.
These issues are most prominent in contemporary debates over the
continued expansion of intellectual property rights.' The conflict over
* Associate Professor, Loyola University Chicago School of Law. Thanks to John
Breen, Darren Bush, Michael Carrier, Robert Draba, Herbert Hovenkamp, Michael Ja-

cobs, Ted Janger, Mark Lemley, Christopher Leslie, David McGowan, Michael Pardo,
Frank Pasquale, Andreas Reindl, James Speta, Richard Squires, Christopher Sprigman,

Phil Weiser, Joshua Wright, and participants at workshops and conferences at the American Antitrust Institute, Boston University, Cornell University, Fordham University, Michi-

gan State University, and University of Wisconsin for their comments on earlier versions
of this article. Thanks to ourJournal editor, Lore Unt, and anonymous reviewers as well.
** Associate Dean for Faculty Research, Professor, and Director, Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies, Loyola University Chicago School of Law. Thanks to Robert
Hernquist, Lindsay Frank Dansdil, and Jackie Clisham for their research assistance with
this project.
I For an overview of these debates and discussion of the expansion of intellectual property rights, see generally YocHAm BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETwoRKS: How SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (2003); EXPANDING
THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERT=. INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE
SOCIETY (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001); LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FuTURE OF

IDEAS (2001); Mark A. Lemley, Propety, IntellectualProperty, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV.
1031 (2005) [hereinafter Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding].
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access and exclusion is a central, persistent feature of intellectual property law. Those who create, invent, innovate, and participate in similar
intellectually driven, productive activities often borrow from or share
with others. It is impossible to divest from oneself that which one has
been exposed to; inevitably, the intellectual products of past and contemporary producers serve as inputs into each of our own productive
activities. So, to be intellectually productive, we necessarily borrow and
share. Open access facilitates widespread borrowing, sharing, and participation in intellectual production.2
But at the core of intellectual property is the right to exclude, without
which some producers would abandon their efforts for fear of free riding (unlicensed sharing) by competitors. Without some exclusion, competition by unlicensed borrowers would, at times, undermine incentives
to invest resources in the first place. Yet exclusion introduces deadweight losses and may stifle productive use of intellectual resources. In
the end, intellectual property laws strike a balance and create a semicommons arrangement-a complex mix of private rights and commons
designed to facilitate both exclusion and open access.' The pivot on the
intellectual property seesaw has steadily been pushed to favor privatization, but the debate persists.
In telecommunications, these issues have surfaced again and again.
Communications networks have traditionally been conceptualized as infrastructure subject to substantial access and nondiscrimination norms
and, as a result, have been heavily regulated. In recent decades, efforts
to introduce competition and at the same time to deregulate communications industries has led to vociferous debates about the merits of private control, government regulation, and open access.
In antitrust law, the same fault lines appear-only they often are not
recognized as such. The essential facilities doctrine holds that dominant
firms may incur antitrust liability if they do not provide access to their
2See Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons Management, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917 (2005) [hereinafter An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and
Commons Management]. For a comprehensive account of widespread peer production of
information, see BENKLER, supra note 1; see also Brett M. Frischmann, Cultural Environmentalism as a Lens to (Re)View the Wealth of Networks, 74 U. CHI. L. REv. 1083 (2007) (reviewing YOCHAI BENKLER, A WEALTH OF NETWORKS: How SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS
MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006)).

3See generally Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV.
257 (2007). Whether intellectual property law has struck the proper balance continues to
be debated and appears to be impossible to determine empirically. The question largely
appears to be a normative one. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION:
THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY

http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf.
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unique facilities, even to competitors, on a nondiscriminatory basis
where sharing is feasible 4 and the competitors cannot obtain or create
the facility on their own.
Although antitrust liability based on the essential facilities doctrine is
long established in past case law and enforcement actions of the Department of Justice Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission,
the doctrine is currently being challenged on four fronts. First, the Supreme Court has dealt with the essential facilities doctrine through an
apparent strategy of death by dicta, all but disavowing its prior case law
on the subject. Second, Congress created an antitrust review commission that considered whether to recommend narrowing or abolishing
the doctrine, and the Commission ultimately recommended leaving the
matter to the courts. Third, U.S. and foreign antitrust enforcement
agencies have conducted hearings on the legal standards governing
dominant firms, in which the essential facilities doctrine faced significant critique. Finally, academic scholars have subjected the essential facilities doctrine to criticism for years. Not surprisingly, those who would
shield dominant firms from having to share their property under pain of
antitrust liability use the same rhetoric of private rights that is fueling
the same positions in hotly contested debates in intellectual property,
telecommunications, and other fields.
We propose in this article not only to reinvigorate the essential facilities doctrine, but to do so on economics grounds and to tie its revitalization to the ongoing debates over open access in other fields. Seen in this
wider context, the essential facilities doctrine is one expression of the
venerable principle in Anglo-Saxon law favoring open access for certain

4 Closely related is the possibility of antitrust liability for dominant firms that refuse to
deal with competitors, even the possibility of liability for refusal to license intellectual
property rights. Compare Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d
1195, 1216 (9th Cir. 1997) (refusal to license without objective business justification may
be antitrust violation), with Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1327-28
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (no duty for owner of intellectual property to deal with competitors), cert.
denied sub noma.CSU, L.L.C. v. Xerox Corp., 531 U.S. 1143 (2001). See generallyJoseph P.

Bauer, Refusals to Deal with Competitors by Owners of Patents and Copyrights: Reflections on the
Image Technical and Xerox Decisions, 55 DEPAUL L. REv. 1211 (2006); Michael A. Carrier,
Refusals to License Intellectual Property after Trinko, 55 DEPAuL L. Rsv. 1191 (2006); Robert
Pitofsky, Challenges of the New Economy: Issues at the Intersection of Antitrust and Intellectual
Property, 68 ArNTITRUST L.J. 913, 919-23 (2001); Richard J. Gilbert & Carl Shapiro, An
Economic Analysis of UnilateralRefusals to License Intellectual Property, 93 PROC. NAT'L AcAn.
Sci. USA 12749 (1996), available at http://pnas.org/cgi/reprint/93/23/12749.pdf; David
McGowan, Regulating Competition in the Information Age: Computer Software as an Essential
Facility Under the Sherman Act, 18 HASTINGS COMM. & ErNr. L.J. 771 (1996).
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facilities, assets, and property that are "affected with the public
interest."5
In more modern parlance, these kinds of assets and facilities are often
described as infrastructure. Traditional infrastructure includes bridges,
highways, ports, electrical power grids, and telephone networks-but infrastructure can also include nontraditional, even noncommercial,
items, such as ideas, the Internet, and other assets that are vital inputs to
the production of wealth at later stages of production on a basis disproportionate to their actual use. The significant positive externalities
("spillovers") that open access produces make open access socially desirable and internalization through exclusive property rights inefficient.
Stated more broadly, open access to infrastructural resources supports
society's economic interest in wealth maximization and allocative efficiency as well as other societal goals of fairness, equality, and
nondiscrimination.
In the antitrust field, all this is an abstract debate until a dominant
firm controls such a unique infrastructural asset and unreasonably refuses to grant access to a competitor that needs access in order to compete with the monopolist at some other stage of production. This could
include a long-distance telephone company that requires interconnection to the local phone system, or a wholesale power company that requires physical interconnection with the local power transmission or
distribution system. There is no theoretical reason why a computer program, the Internet itself, or even an idea might not similarly constitute
infrastructure and thus require a regime of open access. When refusal to
grant access to infrastructure (as defined below) is a means of either
acquiring or maintaining a monopoly, antitrust liability should ensue.
In this article, we set out our theory of why the essential facilities doctrine is a vital, but limited, tool to ensure more efficient and economically desirable open access to both traditional and nontraditional
infrastructure. We reframe the debate to ask the question of whether a
dominant firm is denying access to infrastructural assets for which non5Walton H. Hamilton, Affectation with PublicInterest, 39 YALE L.J. 1089, 1100-01 (1930).
The notion goes back in U.S. law to Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876), and the other
Granger cases that upheld the constitutionality of rate regulation for railroad grain elevators. In English law, it goes back to the writings of Lord Matthew Hale in 1676. See generally
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836-1937, at 199-204 (1991);
ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM (1983); BRUCE WYMAN, THE SPECIAL
LAW GOVERNING PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATIONS AND ALL OTHERS ENGAGED IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT

ley, 5

STAN.

(1911); Charles Fairman, The So-Called CrangerCases, Lord Hale, and Justice BradL. REV. 587 (1953); Breck P. McAllister, Lord Hale and Business Affected with a

Public Interest, 43 HARv. L. REV. 759 (1930); Bruce Wyman, The Law of Public Callings as a

Solution to the Trust Problem, 17 HARv. L. REV. 156 (1904).

HeinOnline -- 75 Antitrust L.J. 4 2008-2009

2008]

REVITALIZING ESSENTIAL FACILITIES

discriminatory access would benefit us all, and respond to the many critics of the current formulation of the essential facilities doctrine.
We review the traditional essential facilities doctrine as applied in
practice by the U.S. Supreme Court and by name in the lower courts in
Part I of the article. In Part II, we define our theory of infrastructure,
explain why infrastructural assets require a regime of open access, and
connect infrastructure theory to the essential facilities doctrine in antitrust. We assert that infrastructure theory best explains how the essential
facilities doctrine works in antitrust law in Part III.
We then respond to the principal criticisms of the essential facilities
doctrine in Part IV. In Part IV.A, we address critics' concerns that the
essential facilities doctrine merely divides, and does not increase, consumer welfare. We address critics' concerns over how the essential facilities doctrine affects incentives in Part IV.B. We argue in Part IV.C that
courts are able to apply these concepts in a consistent and administrable
manner.
Part V then ties together the theoretical discussion and responses to
critics with a number of concrete applications. We ground our theoretical discussion in practical real-world contexts and demonstrate that our
model provides a coherent basis for determining whether open access is
needed. We do so by applying our theory to a series of past, present, and
future controversies, including access to sports stadiums, ski slopes, the
Associated Press network, modern telecommunications networks,
Microsoft Windows, and Apple's iPod/iTunes. Finally, in Part VI, we
conclude by discussing the critical role of a rehabilitated essential facilities doctrine in an era of deregulation.
II. THE ESSENTIAL FACILITIES DOCTRINE
Although the essential facilities doctrine has been described as having
"a long and respected history as part of U.S. antitrust law," 6 it has also
been a controversial doctrine. As a result, the essential facilities doctrine
has fluctuated in popularity, definition, and use by the courts and enforcement agencies as a basis for imposing antitrust liability. In recent
years, attempts to restrict or eliminate its use have become more
pronounced.

6 Robert Pitofsky, Donna Patterson & Jonathan Hooks, The Essential FacilitiesDoctrine
Under U.S. Antitrust Law, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 443, 445 (2002).
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THE TRADITIONAL DOCTRINE

The essential facilities doctrine arose early in the history of U.S. antitrust law. The Supreme Court used Section 1 of the Sherman Act in a
variety of settings to impose obligations of equal and nondiscriminatory
access, although it did not use the essential facilities doctrine by name.
In Terminal Railroad Association, the Court in 1912 directed the issuance
of an injunction requiring the joint operators of the only railroad bridge
across the Mississippi River to grant open and equal access to all competitors. 7 Later, in 1945, the Court required the Associated Press to offer
nondiscriminatory membership terms to news organizations that competed with its existing members. 8 Finally, in Otter Tail, the case closest to
the core conception of the essential facilities doctrine, the Court in 1973
affirmed the grant of an injunction against a regulated power company
that refused to transmit power generated by competing companies
through its transmission system to municipal distribution systems that
wanted to buy cheaper power from the defendant's competitors. 9
The Seventh Circuit laid out the modern version of the doctrine in
1983, in MCI v. AT&T.10 The MCI case concerned an antitrust challenge
by a long-distance competitor of the then-regulated monopolist local
telephone company, AT&T. AT&T controlled the local phone systems
necessary to connect both ends of any long-distance phone call. MCI
alleged that AT&T unjustifiedly failed to interconnect MCI's superior
microwave technology to the local loop so that MCI customers' calls
could be completed. AT&T argued that its refusal to interconnect was
justified based on cream-skimming arguments, technological incompatibility, and lack of regulatory approval."
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed liability under the essential
facilities doctrine. It required the plaintiff to establish the following
elements:
1. The monopolist controls access to an essential facility;
2. The facility cannot be reasonably duplicated by a competitor;
3. The monopolist denies access to a competitor; and

7 See United States v. Terminal R.R Ass'n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383, 411-13 (1912).
8Assoc. Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1945) (Associated Press I).
9 Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 382 (1973).
10MCI Commc'ns Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132-33 (7th Cir. 1983).
" Id. at 1133-1141 (describing and rejecting AT&T's regulatory and other defenses of
its refusal to interconnect).
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4. It was feasible for the monopolist to grant access.' 2
Following MCI, the lower courts widely adopted the essential facilities
doctrine, l" but the Supreme Court has never used it by name. The closest the Supreme Court came to doing so was in Aspen Skiing-in which it
affirmed a jury verdict of antitrust liability that the appellate court had
affirmed in reliance on the essential facilities doctrine. 14 In Aspen Skiing,
the defendant "monopolist" controlled three of four ski mountains in
Aspen, Colorado.' 5 The defendant had engaged in a longstanding proconsumer joint venture with the remaining competitor, which owned
the fourth mountain in the valley. The defendant then abruptly terminated the joint venture without a credible business justification. The Supreme Court affirmed the verdict for the plaintiff, but declined to
address the essential facilities test used by the lower court. Instead, the
Supreme Court relied on the monopolist's termination of a successful
consumer-friendly program that lacked a plausible business justification,
and on the defendant's willingness to sacrifice profits to injure competition on a long-term basis.' 6
Since MCI and Aspen Skiing, there has been a gradual narrowing of
the essential facilities doctrine. Courts have applied the doctrine more
stringently and more sparingly. Nonetheless, the lower courts have repeatedly turned to it because it represents a fundamental understanding
about the misuse of monopoly power.
Courts are becoming increasingly sophisticated about insisting on the
truly "essential" nature of the facility at issue. For example, even a smalltown hospital is not an essential facility for antitrust purposes to a doctor
that it excluded, where the excluded doctor had other reasonable alternative facilities available to perform surgical procedures, including outpatient surgery in an office setting. 17 Courts have had even easier times
12 Id. The Seventh Circuit reversed liability on certain other theories and remanded
for a new trial on damages. The case subsequently settled.
13 Cases collected at I ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAw DEVELOPMENTS
261-66 (6th ed. 2007).
14Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 611 (1985), aftg,
738 F.2d 1509 (10th Cir. 1984).
15For reasons that are inexplicable, the defendant never appealed the finding in the
lower court that it had monopoly power in a relevant market for downhill skiing in Aspen,
Colorado. See id. at 596 n.20, 600 n.26.
16The significance and legacy of the Aspen decision is debated in a recent symposium
issue in the Antitrust Law JournaL Symposium, Aspen Skiing 20 Years Later, 73 ANTITRUST

L.J. 59 (2005).
17 Castelli v. Meadville Med. Ctr., 702 F. Supp. 1201, 1209 (W.D. Pa. 1988), af'd, 872
F.2d 411 (3d Cir. 1989). See also McKenzie v. Mercy Hosp., 854 F.2d 365, 371 (10th Cir.
1988). The largely unsuccessful line of essential facilities doctrine cases in the health care
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rejecting essential facilities claims when the plaintiff wanted access to
advertising in a competitor's magazine when it was free to create its own
magazine or advertise in other media channels.' 8 Most recently, little
more than common sense doomed an antitrust claim by a disfavored
seller excluded from an annual three-day re-creation of 19th century fur
trading in Wyoming. The court sensibly relied on the fact that the plaintiff remained free to sell his wares anywhere he wished, except on the
event grounds for the particular weekend of the fair.' 9
The best cases for the essential facilities model typically involve the
denial of access to infrastructure and networks, particularly in the context of regulated industries in transition.20 In a time of privatization and
deregulation, antitrust generally is being asked to do the heavy lifting
previously done by traditional command-and-control regulation to assure a competitive marketplace. However, it is precisely these cases, despite being well supported by theory and precedent, that are most under
attack and most in need of revival.
B.

DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS

The counterattack against the essential facilities doctrine is in full
2
bloom. The doctrine has been subject to increasing scholarly criticism. '
area is surveyed in Scott D. Makar, The EssentialFacility Doctrine and the Health CareIndustry,
21 FLA.
ST. U. L. REv. 913, 927-43 (1994).
1
8 Twin Labs., Inc. v. Weider Health & Fitness, 900 F.2d 566, 569 (2d Cir. 1990).
19
Gregory v. Fort Bridger Rendezvous Ass'n, 448 F.3d 1195, 1204-05 (10th Cir. 2006).
20 See discussion infra Part III.
21 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 237
(2005) [hereinafter THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE]; PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW § 771c (2d ed. 2002) ("harmful," "unnecessary," and "should

be abandoned"); Paul D. Marquardt & Mark Leddy, The Essential Facilities Doctrine and
IntellectualPropertyRights: A Response to Pitofsky, Patterson, and Hooks, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 847
(2003) (advocating a narrow application of the essential facilities doctrine to intellectual

property licensing); Abbott B. Lipsky & J. Gregory Sidak, Essential Facilities,51 STAN. L.
REV. 1187, 1248 (1999) (no coherent rationale for doctrine); Allen Kezbom & Alan V.

Goldman, No Shortcut to Antitrust Analysis: The Twisted Journey of the "EssentialFacilities"Doctrine, 1996 COL. Bus. L. Rv. 1 (1996); Gilbert & Shapiro, supra note 4 (forced licensing of
IP equivalent to essential facilities doctrine and normally not welfare enhancing); David

McGowan, supra note 4; Keith N. Hylton, Economic Rents and EssentialFacilities, 1991 BYU
L. REv. 1243 (1991); Phillip Areeda, EssentialFacilities:An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 841 (1990); GregoryJ. Werden, The Law and Economics of the Essential Facility Doctrine,33 ST. Louis U. L.J. 433 (1987); Michael Boudin, Antitrust Doctrine and
the Sway of Metaphor, 75 GEO.L.J. 395, 397-403 (1986); David J. Gerber, Note, Rethinking
the Monopolist's Duty to Deal: A Legal and Economic Critique of the Doctrine of "EssentialFacilities," 74 VA. L. REV. 1069 (1988); Daniel E. Troy, Note, Unclogging the Bottleneck: A New
EssentialFacilities Doctrine,83 COLUM. L. REV. 441 (1983) (claiming that essential facilities

doctrine is not applied with principled consistency and arguing for narrower rule of reason version of doctrine with additional defenses for incumbent firms). But see LAWRENCE
A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK
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In the influential Areeda and Hovenkamp treatise, for example, the authors describe the doctrine as "harmful" and "unnecessary," and argue
forcefully that it "should be abandoned.

22

The Trinko decision in 2004 represents the near extinction of the doctrine in the Supreme Court, in a case in which it probably should not
have been discussed at all.2 3 In Trinko, a customer of the incumbent local phone service monopolist brought a private antitrust class action
challenging the dominant firm's discrimination against a competitor,
which allegedly resulted in overpriced and inadequate phone service.
The Supreme Court ultimately ruled that the sole remedy was through
state and federal regulatory provisions and that the complaint otherwise
failed to state a claim under the antitrust laws.
Although its statements on the doctrine were not "essential" to the
ruling, and technically dicta, the Court in Trinko appeared to go out of
its way to restrict, and nearly reject, the essential facilities doctrine. It
stated:
This conclusion would be unchanged even if we considered to be established law the "essential facilities" doctrine crafted by some lower
courts, under which the Court of Appeals concluded respondent's allegations might state a claim. We have never recognized such a doctrine,
and we find no need either to recognize it or to repudiate it here. It
suffices for present purposes to note that the indispensable requirement for invoking the doctrine is the unavailability of access to the
"essential facilities;" where access exists, the doctrine serves no purpose. Thus, it is said that "essential facility claims should... be denied
where a state or federal agency has effective power to compel sharing
and to regulate its scope and terms." Respondent believes that the existence of sharing duties under the 1996 Act supports its case. We think
the opposite: The 1996 Act's extensive provision for access makes it
unnecessary to impose a judicial doctrine of forced access. To the extent respondent's "essential24facilities" argument is distinct from its general argument, we reject it.

124-30 (2d ed. 2006) (supporting doctrine forjointly operated facilities and more limited
version of doctrine for unilaterally controlled essential facilities); Pitofsky et al., supranote
6 (endorsing doctrine as currently defined); Glenn 0. Robinson, On Refusing to Deal with
Rivals, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1177 (2002) (endorsing essential facilities doctrine in lieu of
broader general duty to deal for monopolists); James R. Ratner, Should There Be an Essential Facility Doctrine? 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 327, 367-68 (1988) (supporting a narrowly
defined version of the doctrine).
22
AREEOA & HOWNKAMp, ANTITRUST LAw, supra note 21, § 771c.
2
3 Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
24 Id. at 410-11 (citations omitted). This passage can be viewed more neutrally, but we
believe that properly viewed in context it represents a fundamental embrace of skepticism
as to both the essential facilities doctrine and judicial enforcement of Section 2 of the
Sherman Act more generally. Trinko arguably preserved a version of the essential facilities
doctrine forjoint refusals to deal under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 540 U.S. at 410 n.3.
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The essential facilities doctrine has been reviewed in various forums,
including the U.S. Antitrust Modernization Commission 25 and joint
hearings by the FTC and the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department on single-firm dominance. 26 In addition, the International Compe27
tition Network has created a working group on exclusionary conduct,
and the European Union is reviewing standards for abuse of a dominant
position under their competition law. 28 It is anticipated that, with the
possible exception of the European Union, the essential facilities doctrine may be in for further criticism in these and other future forums.
III. ESSENTIAL FACILITIES, INFRASTRUCTURE,
AND OPEN ACCESS

29

As traditionally conceived, essential facilities doctrine focuses mostly
on supply-side considerations. The existing doctrinal test focuses on the
nature of an upstream resource and the market conditions for supplying
the resource, asking whether competitive supply is possible.30 "Essentiality" in the existing test appears to be a rather inarticulate and unrefined
demand-side consideration. It is not very clear what exactly "essentiality"
means: what makes a facility essential other than the lack of alternative
substitutes? Many have critiqued the essential facilities doctrine on the
grounds that it is too open-ended and insufficiently defined. We believe
that this is a result, at least in part, of the demand-side piece being underspecified. Infrastructure theory, we argue, provides a needed theoretical and practical set of demand-side considerations that should be
incorporated into the essential facilities doctrine.

25 See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2007),
available at http://www.amc.gov/report recommendation/amc final-report.pdf; Antitrust Modernization Comm'n, Public Hearings, Exclusionary Conduct: Refusals to Deal
and Bundling and Loyalty Discounts (Sept. 29, 2005), available at http://www.amc.gov/
commissionhearings/pdf/050929_Exclus ConductTranscriptreform.pdf.
26
See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Public Hearings, Antitrust Division, Single-Firm Conduct
and Antitrust Law, Issues for Consideration, http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/hearings/
singlefirm/sfchearing.htm#issues.
27 See Int'l Competition Network (ICN), Unilateral Conduct, http://www.international
competitionnetwork.org/index.php/en/working-groups/unilateral-conduct.
28 See European Comm'n, Article 82 Review, available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/
competition/antitrust/art82/index.html.
2 This Part is drawn with some adaptation from Frischmann, An Economic Theory of
Infrastructure and Commons Management, supra note 2.
30 Recall the MCI factors discussed above. Factors #1, #2, and #4 ask: Is access to the
facility controlled by a monopolist? Can it be reasonably duplicated?Is it sharable?The behavior or
conduct of producer-suppliers is relevant (see Factor #3: denial of access by monopolist), but
the key economic question seems to be whether there are impediments to competitive
supply of the facility in question.
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A.

INFRASTRUCTURE RESOURCES

Infrastructure resources generate value as inputs into a wide range of
productive processes, often supporting many distinct markets downstream. The term "infrastructure" generally conjures up the notion of
physical resource systems made by humans for public consumption. A
list of common examples includes: (1) transportation systems, such as
highway and road systems, railways, airline systems, and ports, etc.; (2)
communication systems, such as telephone networks and postal services;
(3) governance systems, such as court systems; and (4) basic public services
and facilities, such as schools, sewers, and water systems.
Two generalizations about infrastructure are worth noting at the outset. First, the government has played, and continues to play, a significant
and widely accepted role in ensuring the provision of many infrastructure resources. While private parties and markets play an increasingly
important role in providing many types of traditional infrastructure due
to a wave of privatization, as well as cooperative ventures between industry and government, the government's position as provider, coordinator, subsidizer, and/or regulator of traditional infrastructure remains
intact in the United States and in most communities throughout the
world. The wave of privatization should be associated with more, not
less, need for the essential facilities doctrine, as infrastructure once held
in government hands is now private."
Second, traditional infrastructures generally are managed in an
openly accessible manner. They are managed so that the resources are
accessible to members of a community who wish to use the resources on
nondiscriminatory terms. This does not mean that access is free. We pay
tolls to access highways; we buy stamps to send letters; we pay telephone
companies to have our calls routed across their lines, and so on.
Nor does it mean that access to the resource is unregulated. Transportation of hazardous substances by highway or mail, for example, is heavily regulated. Other aspects of infrastructure are more lightly regulated,
but the government remains active as overseer of the infrastructure and
the terms of access. The key point is that the resource typically is openly
accessible to all within a community on nondiscriminatory terms regardless of the identity of the end-user or the end-use.
Managing infrastructure in this fashion makes economic sense. Doing
so maintains openness, does not discriminate among users or uses of the
resource, and eliminates the need to obtain approval or a license to use

31

Oddly, the law is moving in the opposite direction. See supra Part I.B.
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the resource. As a general matter, managing infrastructure resources in
this fashion eliminates the need to rely on either market actors or the
government to "pick winners" downstream. This facilitates competition
downstream, innovation and experimentation with new uses, and often
3 2
the generation of positive externalities that result in large social gains.
B.

DEMAND-SIDE THEORY OF INFRASTRUCTURE

Infrastructure constitutes an important class of resources for which
society values common public access. Our point is not that all infrastructure resources should be managed in an openly accessible manner.
Rather, for certain classes of resources, the economic arguments for
managing the resources in an openly accessible manner vary in strength
and substance.
Infrastructure resources tend to satisfy the following demand-side
criteria:
1. The resource may be consumed non-rivalrously;
2. Social demand for the resource is driven primarily by downstream
productive activity that requires the resource as an input; and
3. The resource is used as an input into a wide range of goods and
services, including private goods, public goods, and/or non-market
3
goods.1
32 See Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructureand Commons Management, supra
note 2; Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 3. Most economists agree that infrastructure
resources generate significant positive externalities that result in "large social gains." W.
Edward Steinmueller, Technological Infrastructure in Information Technology Industries, in
TECHNOLOGICAL INFRASTRUCTURE POLICY: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 117, 117
(Teubal et al. eds., 1996). Carol Rose was the first legal academic to draw an explicit,
causal connection between open access and these positive externalities. In her path-breaking article, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently PublicProperty, 53 U.
CHI. L. REv. 711 (1986), Rose explained that a "comedy of the commons" arises where
open access to a resource leads to scale returns-greater social value with greater use of
the resource. Id. at 723. With respect to road systems, for example, Rose considered commerce to be an
interactive practice whose exponential returns to increasing participation run
on without limit .... Through ever-expanding commerce, the nation becomes
ever-wealthier, and hence trade and commerce routes must be held open to the
public, even if contrary to private interest. Instead of worrying that too many
people will engage in commerce, we worry that too few will undertake the effort.
Id. at 769-70. Critically, as Rose recognized, managing road systems in an openly accessible manner is the key to sustaining and increasing participation in commerce, and commerce is itself a productive activity that generates significant positive externalities.
3 We are defining a category of infrastructure resources. The category is not all-inclusive in the sense that some resources generally considered to be infrastructure do not fit
within this definition neatly. This does not affect our analysis, which only applies to resources that do fit within the definition.
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Traditional infrastructure-such as roadways, telephone networks, and
electricity grids-satisfy this definition, as do a wide range of resources
not traditionally considered as infrastructure resources, such as lakes,
ideas, and the Internet.
The first demand-side criterion describes the "sharable" nature of infrastructure resources. Infrastructure is sharable in the sense that the
resources can be accessed and used by multiple users at the same time.
Infrastructure resources vary in their capacity to accommodate multiple
users, and this variance in capacity differentiates non-rivalrous (infinite
capacity) resources from partially non-rivalrous (finite but renewable capacity) resources. Simply put, non-rivalry opens the door to widespread
access and productive use of the resource. For non-rivalrous resources
of infinite capacity, the marginal costs of allowing an additional person
to access the resource are zero.
For partially non-rivalrous resources of finite capacity, the cost-benefit
analysis is more complicated because of the possibility of congestion
through competing uses and users. These resources may be consumed
non-rivalrously or rivalrously, depending upon the conditions, such as
how the resource is managed, the number of users, and the available
capacity. During off-peak hours, for example, the highway may be consumed non-rivalrously, but when usage is at its peak there may be congestion, in which case consumption becomes rivalrous. Congestion
problems can be overcome by management choices, such as capacity
expansion, regulation by the market (by price), government regulation
s4
(command and control), norms, or even technology
The second and third demand-side criteria focus on the manner in
which infrastructure resources create social value. The second criterion
emphasizes that infrastructure resources are intermediate goods that
create social value when utilized productively downstream and that such
use is the primary source of social benefits. In other words, while some
infrastructure resources may be consumed directly to produce immediate benefits, most of the value derived from the resources results from
productive use rather than consumption.
The third criterion emphasizes both the variance of downstream outputs (the genericness of the input) and the nature of those outputs
(particularly, public goods and non-market goods). The reason for em-

34If a particular asset were fully congested and could not accommodate additional
users, this would be a defense under the fourth prong of MCI under the traditional formulation of the essential facilities doctrine. Nothing in our infrastructure theory would
change this result.
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phasizing variance and the production of public goods and non-market
goods downstream is that, when these criteria are satisfied, the social
value created by allowing additional users to access and use the resource
may be substantial, but extremely difficult to measure. The information
problems associated with assessing demand for the resource and valuing
its social benefits plague both infrastructure suppliers and users where
users are using the infrastructure as an input to produce public goods or
non-market goods. This is an information problem that is pervasive and
not easily solved.
Whether we are talking about transportation systems, the electricity
grid, basic research (ideas), environmental ecosystems, or Internet infrastructure, the bulk of the social benefits generated by the resources
derives from the downstream uses. Value is created downstream by a
wide variety of end users that rely on access to the infrastructure. Yet
social demand for the infrastructure itself is extremely difficult to
measure.
From an economic perspective, it makes sense to manage certain infrastructure resources in an openly accessible manner because doing so
permits a wide range of downstream producers of private, public, and
non-market goods to flourish. As Professor Yochai Benkler has noted,
"[t] he high variability in value of using both transportation and communications facilities from person to person and time to time have made a
commons-based approach to providing the core facilities immensely
valuable.'35
To better understand and evaluate these complex economic relationships, we define three general categories of infrastructure resources, illustrated in Table 1, based on the nature of the distribution of
downstream activities: commercial, public, and social infrastructure.

35

Yochai Benkler, Property, Commons, and the First Amendment: Towards a Core Common
Infrastructure 47-48 (Brennan Ctr. for Justice, NYU School of Law White Paper, Mar.
2001), available at http://www.benkler.org/WhitePaper.pdf.
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TABLE 1: TYPOLOGY OF INFRASTRUCTURE RESOURCES
Type

Definition

Examples

Commercial
Infrastructure

Non-rivalrous or
partially non-rivalrous
input into the
production of a wide
variance of private
goods

1. Basic manufacturing
processes
2. Ports
3. Highway systems
4. Electrical power grid

Public Infrastructure

Non-rivalrous or
partially non-rivalrous
input into the
production of a wide
variance of public goods

1. The Internet
2. Electrical power grid
3. Basic research

Social Infrastructure

Non-rivalrous or
partially non-rivalrous
input into the

1. The Internet
2. Highway systems
3. Electrical power grid

production of a wide

4. Basic research

variance of non-market

goods
These categories are neither exhaustive nor mutually exclusive. Realworld infrastructure resources often fit within more than one of these
categories at the same time. For example, the Internet is a combination
of all three types of infrastructure and is thus a mixed infrastructure.The
analytical advantage of this general categorization scheme is that it provides a means for understanding the social value generated by these infrastructure resources, identifying different types of market failures, and
formulating the appropriate rules to correct such failures.
Pure commercial infrastructure resources are used to produce private
goods. Consider the examples listed in Table 1. Basic manufacturing
processes, such as die casting, milling, and the concept of the assembly
line, are all non-rivalrous inputs into the production of a wide variety of
private manufactured goods. Similarly, basic agricultural processes and
food-processing techniques are non-rivalrous inputs into the production
of a wide variety of private agricultural goods and foodstuffs. Many suppliers productively use commercial infrastructure resources purely as delivery mechanisms for manufactured goods, agricultural goods,
foodstuffs, and many other commercial products. Ports, for example, act
as an infrastructural input into the delivery of a wide range of private
goods. Similarly, the Internet and highway systems are mixed infrastructures used by a wide range of suppliers to deliver private goods and services. The Internet and highway systems, in contrast with ports, also are
used as inputs to support a wide range of other socially valuable
activities.
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Public and social infrastructure resources are used to produce public
goods and non-market goods, respectively.3 6 For both public and social
infrastructure, the ability of competitive output markets to effectively
generate and process information regarding demand for the required
input is less clear than in the case of commercial infrastructure. Infrastructure users that produce public goods and non-market goods suffer
valuation problems because they generally do not fully measure or appropriate the benefits of the outputs they produce and consequently do
not accurately represent actual social demand for the infrastructure resource. Instead, for public and social infrastructure, demand generated
by competitive output markets will tend to reflect the individual benefits
realized by a particular user and not take into account positive externalities enjoyed by society as a whole. 37 Difficulties in measuring and appropriating value generated in output markets translates into a valuation/
36 From the demand side, the important distinction between these outputs-what separates non-market goods in particular from public goods-is the means by which they
create value for society. The value of public goods is realized upon consumption. That is,
upon obtaining access to a public good, a person consumes it and appreciates benefits
(value or utility). The production of public goods has the potential to generate positive
externalities. Whether the benefits are external to production depends upon the conditions of access and whether the producer internalizes the value realized by others upon
consumption. By contrast, the value of non-market goods is realized in a more osmotic
fashion and not through direct consumption. Non-market goods change environmental
conditions and social interdependencies in ways that increase social welfare. Take, for
example, active participation in democratic dialogue or education. While participants
may realize direct benefits as a result of their activity, non-participants (non-consumers)
also benefit-not because they also may gain access to the good (dialogue or education),
but instead because of the manner in which dialogue or education affects societal conditions. See generally Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructureand Commons Management, supra note 2, at 964-67.
37In contrast with network effects, infrastructure effects do not necessarily increase
users' willingness to pay for access to the infrastructure resource. A user's willingness to
pay for access to the infrastructure resource is limited to the benefits that can be obtained
by the user, which depend upon the nature of the outputs produced, the extent to which
such outputs generate positive externalities, and the manner in which those externalities
are distributed. Infrastructure effects resemble indirect network effects in the sense that a
larger number (or a wider variance) of applications may lead to an increase in consumers' valuation of the infrastructure or network, but the externalities generated by public
and social infrastructure are even more indirect in that they are diffuse, derived from
public and non-market goods, and not simply a function of increased availability of desired end-users or end-uses. Further, the externalities generated by public and social infrastructure often positively affect the utility of non-users, that is, members of society that
are not using the infrastructure itself. In a sense, the positive externalities generated by
the outputs are closely connected to the nature of the outputs and only loosely connected
to the complementary relationship between the infrastructure and the output. This is
important because the prospect of infrastructure suppliers internalizing complementary
externalities is much less likely, making the possibility of a demand-side market failure
much more likely. See generally Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Inftastructure and Commons Management, supra note 2, at 970-74. However, the presence of strong network effects further supports an open access requirement. See generally Carl Shapiro, Exclusivity in
Network Industries, 7 GEO. MASON L. REv. 673 (1999).
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measurement problem for infrastructure suppliers, which will not fully
take into account, or provide the services for, the broader set of social
benefits attributable to downstream producers of public or non-market
goods.3 8 As our typology shows, however, the issue of open access to infrastructure is "ubiquitous. '3 9 We now turn to why and when open access
is desirable.
C. THE CASE FOR OPEN ACCESS TO INFRASTRUCTURE

The case for open access must be evaluated carefully and contextually. This Part briefly sets forth the demand-side economic arguments
for managing these different types of infrastructure in an openly accessible manner.

40

For commercial infrastructure, downstream producers of private
goods normally accurately manifest demand for infrastructure because
consumers realize the full value of the goods (i.e., there are no positive
externalities), and are willing to pay for such benefits. Accordingly, from
the demand-side, there is less reason to believe that government intervention into markets is necessary, absent anticompetitive behavior that
affects supply.

38 Consider the Internet, for example. Common nondiscriminatory access to the Internet infrastructure facilitates widespread end-user participation in a variety of socially
valuable productive activities.
End-users... engage in innovation and creation; they speak about anything and
everything; they maintain family connections and friendships; they debate, comment, and engage in political and nonpolitical discourse; they meet new people;
they search, research, learn, and educate; and they build and sustain communities.
These are the types of productive activities that generate substantial social
value, value that too easily evades observation or consideration within conventional economic transactions. When engaged in these activities ....
end-users
interact with each other to build, develop, produce, and distribute public and
nonmarket goods.... [P]articipation in such activities results in external benefits that accrue to society as a whole (online and offline) [and] are not captured
or necessarily even appreciated by the participants.
Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructureand Commons Management, supranote 2, at
1017-18 (footnotes omitted).
39 See Joseph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open Access
Policies: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the InternetAge, 17 HARv. J.L. &
TECH. 85, 88 (2003) ("The open access question is even more ubiquitous than it may first
appear, as policymakers and commentators often use different terms to describe the issue. Antitrust commentators discuss the 'primary' (or 'bottleneck') market and the 'secondary' (or 'complementary') market. In telecommunications, participants talk of
'conduits' and 'content.'").
40 This point is developed more fully in Frischmann, An Economic Theory ofInfrastructure
and Commons Management, supra note 2, at 942-56.
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For public or social infrastructure, the case for open access becomes
stronger for a number of reasons. First, output producers are less likely
to accurately manifest demand due to information/appropriation
problems. It is difficult for these producers to measure the value created
by the public good or non-market good outputs. Producers of such outputs are not able to appropriate the full value because consumers are
not willing to pay for the full value due to positive externalities. Such
producers' willingness to pay for access to the input likely will be less
than the amount that would maximize social welfare.
The social costs of restricting access to public or social infrastructure
can be significant, and yet evade observation or consideration within
conventional economic transactions. Initially, we may analyze the issue
as one of high transaction costs and imperfect information. However,
input buyers would still not accurately represent social demand, even
with perfect information and low/no transactions costs, because it is the
benefits generated by the relevant outputs that escape observation and
appropriation. To the extent that infrastructure resources can be optimized for particular applications, there is still a risk that infrastructure
suppliers will favor existing or expected applications, and applications
that generate appropriable and observable benefits, at the expense of
those applications that generate positive externalities.
Economists recognize that there is a case for subsidizing public and
non-market goods producers because such goods are undersupplied by
the market. The effectiveness of directly subsidizing such producers will
vary, however, based on the capacity for subsidy mechanisms to identify
and direct funds to worthy recipients.
In some cases, open access to infrastructure may be a more efficient,
albeit blunt, means for supporting such activities than targeted subsidies. Open access eliminates the need to rely on either the market or
the government to "pick winners" or uses worthy of access. On one
hand, the market picks winners according to the amount of appropriable value generated by outputs, and consequently output producers'
willingness to pay for access to the infrastructure. On the other hand, to
subsidize production of public goods or non-market goods downstream,
the government needs to pick winners by assessing social demand for
such goods based on the social value they create. The inefficiencies, information problems, and transaction costs associated with picking winners under either system mayjustify managing public, social, and mixed
infrastructure resources in an openly accessible manner.
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D. Two

ROLES FOR THE ESSENTIAL FACILITIES DOCTRINE IN ANTITRUST

We see an important but limited role for the essential facilities doctrine in antitrust law with respect to infrastructure. Liability would be
imposed only when open access to infrastructure would provide the societal benefits outlined above, and the conduct of the defendant or defendants otherwise satisfies the standards for a violation of Section 1 or 2
of the Sherman Act.
First, when dealing with pure commercial infrastructure-that is, infrastructure resources primarily used to produce private goods, the doctrine should play a very narrow, cautious role. The doctrine should only
mandate nondiscriminatory access on clear satisfaction of the grounds
articulated in MCI. Non-discriminatory access would consist of granting
competitors access to infrastructure on terms no less favorable than
those granted to the incumbent's current internal or external users.
Our proposal would essentially screen for infrastructure before applying
the traditional legal tests in the area.
Second, when dealing with mixed infrastructure-that is, infrastructure that supports productive activities that yield private, public, and/or
nonmarket goods-the doctrine should play potentially a larger role because the case for nondiscriminatory access is stronger than for pure
commercial infrastructure. As we discuss below, non-discriminatory ac-

cess would also be broader by prohibiting differential treatment among
41

users.

1. Commercial Infrastructure
For pure commercial infrastructure, basic economic theory predicts
that (1) competitive output markets should work well and effectively create demand information for the input; (2) market actors (input suppliers) will process this information; and (3) these market actors will satisfy
the demand efficiently. Simply put, for commercial infrastructure, producers should appropriate sufficient benefits of the private good outputs via sales to consumers and thus should accurately manifest demand
for the required inputs in upstream markets. Therefore, with respect to
demand for commercial infrastructure, the key is maintaining competition in the output markets, where producers are competing to produce
and supply private goods to consumers. Competition is the linchpin in
this context because competitive markets can best assess and satisfy the
demands of the public.

41See infra Part III.B.
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For pure commercial infrastructure,4 2 traditional antitrust principles
provide a sufficient basis for determining whether access is desirable.
The essential facilities doctrine, however, still can play an important role
in the antitrust framework where pure commercial infrastructures are at
stake. The doctrine helps remedy supply-side problems where monopoly
power and the inability to duplicate infrastructure impedes competitive
supply. The MCI test can be understood as exactly such a policing
mechanism.
Under our theory, the essential facilities doctrine would operate
slightly differently than in its current contours. 43 Before applying the
traditional legal tests, we would first screen to determine whether the
facility being denied to competitors is infrastructural. Liability might
well be less broad than it is currently for many types of pure commercial
infrastructure because access would not lead to the substantial, yet hard
to measure, spillovers than make access desirable in the first place. Access to non-infrastructural assets, such as sports stadiums and convention bureaus, would not be granted on the basis of our proposed
essential facilities doctrine. 44 An infrastructure theory of essential facilities would expand access (and potential liability) to infrastructural assets, products, platforms, networks, and 45 processes that support
significant downstream positive externalities.
2. Public, Social, and Mixed Infrastructure
Public, social, and mixed infrastructures are critical to the fabric of
our society. We tend to take for granted many of these foundational
resources and fail to recognize the array of mixed infrastructure that is
truly essential to our economic and social systems. As a result, a far
greater number and type of infrastructural assets should be considered
more than purely commercial in nature. These infrastructures also contribute to social and public goods. Nondiscriminatory access to such as-

42 We should emphasize that "pure" categories of infrastructure are the exception,
rather than the rule. Most infrastructure resources are mixed.
43 We would require strong supply-side reasons to justify mandating access. The MCI
test reflects the relevant supply-side considerations, such as the lack of alternative means
of supply.
44 See Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 539 (7th Cir. 1986) (access to publicly
subsidized sports stadium); Hart Prods., Inc. v. Greater Cincinnati Convention & Visitors
69,233 (S.D. Ohio 1990) (access to convention
Bureau, 1990-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
bureaus).
45 Although infrastructure effects differ from network effects, see discussion supra note
37, they each support open access requirements for slightly different reasons. See generally
Shapiro, supra note 37.
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sets is more likely to generate the kind of hard to measure spillovers that
justify a somewhat more expansive use of the essential facilities doctrine.
The essential facilities doctrine plays a critical role in ensuring nondiscriminatory access to public, social, and mixed infrastructures. We are
not arguing for a broad essential facilities doctrine. 46 Rather, we are providing a way to understand what makes nondiscriminatory access to certain facilities essential. Infrastructure theory helps us identify when
facilities are "affected with the public interest, '47 and thus optimal candidates for open access via essential facilities or other related doctrines,
such as common carriage. 48 We believe that this theory strengthens the
case where the traditional factors are present-that is, the traditional
test for essential facilities should remain in place, but we should generally feel more comfortable with its application to mixed infrastructure.
Changing the focus from a textual analysis of the "essentialness" of
the facility in question to an economic analysis of its role as infrastructure, as we have defined it, does two important things. First, it better
captures the essence of what the case law has been doing for nearly one
hundred years. The law basically gets it right that phone networks,
pipelines, electrical power grids, networks for the production and dissemination of news, and transportation networks require some form of
nondiscriminatory access and support the imposition of antitrust liability when the denial of access creates or maintains a monopoly at one of
the stages of production.
Second, our theory responds to the critics who contend that there is
no sound theoretical basis for the doctrine. We agree that judges and
antitrust enforcers should do more than a seat-of-the-pants analysis of
whether the defendant controls something that is "essential." Refocusing the inquiry on the issue of the presence of infrastructure and the
question of downstream externalities may be difficult in particular cases,
but it is a veritable Occam's Razor compared to the current formulations and the criticisms they have engendered.

46 This

should be evident in our addition of new criteria to the MCI test. See supra Part

II.B.
47See generally Hamilton, supra note 5, at 1100-01.
48 See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, PRINCIPLES FOR A FREE SOCIETY- RECONCILING INDIVIDUAL
LIBERTY WITH THE COMMON GOOD 279-318 (1998) (detailing the history of common car-

rier regulation); see also Marissa A. Piropato, Open Access and the EssentialFacilitiesDoctrine:
Promoting Competition and Innovation, 2000 U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 369, 387 (2000) (drawing
connection between essential facilities doctrine and common carrier doctrine); Earl N.

Cannon, What Constitutes a Common Carrier?, 15 MARQ. L. REv. 67 (1931)
context of transportation industry).

HeinOnline -- 75 Antitrust L.J. 21 2008-2009

(analyzing in

ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 75

IV. THE ESSENTIAL FACILITIES DOCTRINE, REGULATION,
AND INFRASTRUCTURE
It is our goal to restore the essential facilities doctrine to its important, but limited, place in helping to police access to those types of infrastructural assets that require open access in order to create the
positive externalities that benefit society as a whole. The essential facilities doctrine works best as a theory of monopolization when dealing
with infrastructure, in the sense that the facility in question is an input
that creates such substantial downstream positive externalities that a regime of open access is socially desirable. 49 If the firm controlling the
essential infrastructure is not a competitor to those seeking access, certain duties to deal have been imposed since common law times under
the common carrier doctrine, but antitrust law is not at issue. 50 In these
circumstances, no antitrust liability has been imposed for the denial of
5
access, regardless of whether the facility is essential. '
If the firm controlling the essential infrastructure is a competitor of
those seeking access and uses that control to maintain its dominance,
then, and only then, has the essential facility doctrine come into play as
an antitrust concept. The antitrust enforcement agencies from the Reagan administration to the present, even while publicly critiquing the essential facilities doctrine, have all recognized this notion and included
provisions in key consent decrees requiring such dominant firms as
to provide equal access
AT&T, AOL/Time Warner, Intel, and Microsoft
52
situations.
these
in
competitors
upstream
to
49For a more complete discussion of infrastructure theory in these terms, see
Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructureand Commons Management, supra note 2, at
960, and Lawrence Lessig, Reply: Re-Marking the Progress in Frischmann, 89 MINN. L. REv.
1031 (2005). Cf Gerber, supra note 21, at 1073 (proposing an economic theory of essential facilities requiring proof of four salient characteristics: that the facility is unique, that
it remains unique while its output is widely distributed; that it must be centrally located in
the path of the users' production; and that it has the ability to impede or enable the
process by which the users do their business).
50 EPSTEIN, supra note 48, at 279-318. If the owner of the facility is not a competitor of
the entity seeking access, no antitrust liability has been imposed for the denial of access
regardless of whether the facility is essential. See 1 ABA SET'rIoN OF ANTITRUST LAw, supra
note 13, at 278 (collecting cases).
51 See ABA Section of Antitrust Law, supra note 13, at 283 (collecting cases).
52 See, e.g., Silicon Graphics, Inc., 120 F.T.C. 928 (1995); Decision and Order at II.A,
Intel Corp., FTC Docket No. 9288 (Aug. 3, 1999), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/
1999/08/intel.do.htm; United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 142-43, 195-200
(D.D.C. 1982); Final Judgment at 1I1, United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232 (CKK)
(D.D.C. Nov. 12, 2002) (consent decree), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/
f200400/200457.pdf; see also Aaron M. Wigod, Comment The AOL-Time Warner Merger: An
Analysis of the Broadband Internet Access Market, 6J. SMALl. & EMERGING Bus. L. 349, 363-66
(2002) (analyzing open access provisions of consent decree authorizing merger between
AOL and Time-Warner).

HeinOnline -- 75 Antitrust L.J. 22 2008-2009

2008]

REVITALIZING ESSENTIAL FACILITIES

Most antitrust cases with any merit that have invoked the essential facilities doctrine by name or by implication have dealt with some aspect
of infrastructure. These include the cases that the Trinko Court distinguished as involving joint refusals to deal under Section 1 of the Sherman Act rather than monopolization under Section 2.53 However, the
54
only railroad bridge across the Mississippi at the turn of the century,
the network of newspapers comprising the Associated Press around the
time of World War 11,55 the local phone loop controlled by AT&T (and
57
later Verizon),56 the transmission lines controlled by Otter Tail Power,
and under extraordinary circumstances intellectual property rights, 5 all
nicely fall into this notion of infrastructure in both the technical sense
we use and in the colloquial everyday sense of the word. 59
The vast majority of infrastructural assets for which open access would
be socially valuable are neither wholly regulated nor fully deregulated. If
regulation is all encompassing, then statutory or implied antitrust immunity is likely to be present, and neither the essential facilities doctrine
nor the rest of antitrust law would have any application. However, in a
number of cases including MCI itself, a regulated firm was seeking to
maintain or extend its power to an unregulated or less regulated adjacent market.
In the alternative, it is hard to find any truly unregulated facility that
is essential in the sense required by MCI and its progeny.6° The economist Bruce Owen goes so far as to state: "Essential facilities, problematic
and perhaps nonexistent outside the regulated sector, are common in
the regulated industries, where public policy creates absolute entry bar53Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 410 n.3
(2004).
54United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383, 394 (1912).
55
Assoc. Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 4 (1945).
56MCI Commc'ns Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132-33 (7th Cir. 1983).
57Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 368-69 (1973).
58Case C 418/01, IMS Health GmbH & Co. v. NDC Health GmbH & Co., 2004 E.C.R.
1-5039, 4 C.M.L.R. 28 (2004); Joined Cases C-241 & C-242/91, Radio Telefis Eireann
(RTE) v. Comm'n, 1995 E.C.R. 1-743, 4 C.M.L.R. 718 (1995) (Magill); see infra Part V.F.
-9It is also additional support for Professor Fox's conclusion in a recent article that
Trinko is a much easier and better case to impose Section 2 liability than Aspen itself. See
Eleanor M. Fox, Is There Life in Aspen after Trinko? The Silent Revolution in Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 153 (2005). For a more complete analysis of Aspen and
Tjrinko using infrastructure theory, see infra Parts V.A & V.B.
60Former FTC Commissioner Mary Azcuenaga discussed real estate multiple-listing
services and, separately, Chicago Title & Trust ownership of the only complete set of land
title records in Cook County, Illinois, predating the Chicago Fire as possible examples.
Mary L. Azcuenaga, Essential Facilitiesand Regulation: Court or Agency Jurisdiction?,58 ANTITRUST L.J. 879, 882-83, 885 (1990).
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riers." 6' Even the handful of cases treating sports stadiums as essential
facilities may be better explained by virtue of the heavy public subsidization of such facilities, making them impossible to duplicate with purely
private resources. 62 As a result, the courts have dismissed without much
ado most essential facilities cases of the purely unregulated unsubsidized
type on the grounds that the plaintiff could create its own alternative
facility. 63
If anything, the Supreme Court in Trinko has it precisely backwards in
its views on the relationship between the essential facilities doctrine and
regulation. As discussed below in Part V.C, the courts and regulators
have a complementary relationship regarding access to infrastructure.
The Supreme Court appears to reject the application of the essential
facilities doctrine when access to the facility is regulated, but potentially
permits the application of the doctrine when regulation is absent.6
Trinko thus appears to reject the essential facilities doctrine where it is
most needed, and appears to preserve it where it is rarely needed in the
first place. 65
Most of the strongest essential facility cases occur in the twilight zone
of partial regulation, which Trinko appears to have cast into the legal
abyss. Take MCI v. AT&T, which is generally cited as the source of the
modern version of the doctrine. 66 The defendant, AT&T, was the regulated monopolist of local telephone service but it also confronted competition in the long-distance market. AT&T denied MCI access to the
local telephone system, which was necessary to complete the long-distance calls carried over MCI's microwave network. MCI was physically,
61 Bruce

M. Owen, Determining Optimal Access to Regulated Essential Facilities, 58

TRUST L.J. 887, 887 (1990).
6
2 HOVENAMP, THE ANnTRUST ENTERPRISE,

ANTI-

supra note 21, at 247.

63See Twin Labs., Inc. v. Weider Health & Fitness, 900 F.2d 566, 569 (2d Cir. 1990);

McKenzie v. Mercy Hosp., 854 F.2d 365, 370-71 (10th Cir. 1988); Case C-7/97, Oscar
Bronner GmbH & Co. v. Mediaprint Zeitungs, 1998 E.C.R. 1-7791, 4 C.M.L.R. 112 (1999).
64Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 410-11
(2004).
65 Cf Spencer Weber Waller, Microsoft and Trinko: A Tale of Two Courts, 2006 UTAH L.
REV. 741 (2006) [hereinafter Microsoft and Trinko]; Adam Candeub, Trinko and ReGrounding the Refusal to Deal Doctrines, 66 U. Prrr. L. REv. 821 (2005); John T. Soma et al.,
The Essential FacilitiesDoctrine in the Deregulated Telecommunications Industry, 13 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 565, 606 (1998) ("It is within this regulatory context (1996 Telecommunications Act] that the essential facilities doctrine has unique relevance."); Werden, supra
note 21, at 478 ("[L]iability should be imposed only if the essential facility is subject to
pre-existing price regulation"); Hylton, supra note 21, at 1245 ("[A] presumption against
essential facilities claims in regulated markets is not clearly desirable because the doctrine
may serve as a disincentive to anticompetitive transfers of property rights from public to
private ownership.").
66MCI Commc'ns Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1108 (7th Cir. 1983).
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legally, and practically prevented from building its own local telephone
system. AT&T claimed it could not interconnect with MCI because of
existing regulatory restrictions and also because of technological and
system integrity concerns. The courts found all of these purported justifications to be legally or factually insufficient, and frequently pretextual,
67
and imposed Section 2 liability under the essential facilities doctrine.
The handful of subsequent verdicts imposing liability under this theory
primarily have concerned dominant firms resisting deregulation or misusing partial deregulation. The D.C. Circuit of the Microsoft opinion
would probably characterize such behavior as unlawful monopoly maintenance but the Supreme Court in Trinko appeared to consider such
68
conduct beyond the scope of the antitrust laws entirely.

The Supreme Court's own discussion of the essential facilities doctrine in Trinko does not lead to the result it claims. The Trinko opinion

states that "essential facility claims should.., be denied where a state or
federal agency has effective power to compel sharing and to regulate its
scope and terms." 69 The discussion that follows in the opinion hardly
suggests that there was effective regulatory power in this particular case.
For its actions, Verizon was subject to fines totaling $13 million and various reporting obligations. 70 There was no discussion-and there could
not be any at this early procedural stage of the case-of whether these
remedies were "effective" in forcing Verizon to live up to its obligations
under state and federal telecommunications law. However, there is every
indication that they were not. Verizon was prepared to incur litigation
expenses far in excess of this modest fine and reporting obligations to
avoid the one set of penalties that actually would be effective in mandat71
ing nondiscriminatory access.
67 The court also affirmed liability based on the sham litigation doctrine but reversed
portions of the judgment based on predatory pricing claims and remanded for a new trial
on damages based solely on that conduct found to be unlawful. Id. at 1166-69. The case
subsequently settled for a fraction of the original verdict.
68United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). See Waller, Microsoft
and Trinko, supra note 65.
69 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 411 (citing PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST
LAw, §§ 150 & 773e (2003 Supp.)).

7o Id. at 404.
71 There is nothing in the record to suggest that such modest sanctions were "effective"

in any normal sense of the word. Neither Congress nor most commentators think so.
There is also nothing in the numerous past opinions of the Supreme Court on recent
telecommunications issues that shows a great deal of faith in the 1996 Telecommunications Act, FCC regulation, or even regulation in general to create or maintain competitive
markets. See Waller, Microsoft and Trinko, supra note 65, at 747; Michael A. Carrier, Of
Trinko, Tea Leaves, and Intellectual Property, 31 J. CORP. L. 357, 369-70 (2006); Candeub,
supra note 65, at 833; see also Philip J. Weiser, The Relationship Between Antitrust and Regulation in a DeregulatoryEra, 50 ANTITRUST BULL. 549 (2005) [hereinafter The Relationship of
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A viable essential facilities doctrine of necessity exists in the vast economic canyon between fully competitive markets and fully regulated
ones. Fully regulated markets come with extensive regulatory oversight
and accompanying antitrust immunities. Fully deregulated competitive
markets rarely raise the issues of denial of access in the first place. Antitrust has never been particularly clever at dealing with the real world
problems of the complicated twilight zone in between that grows ever
larger in the continuing deregulatory era in which we live. 72 A properly
focused essential facilities doctrine is one modest tool to fill that gap.
We recognize that in some ways a judicially enforced essential facilities doctrine may be a second best solution to a comprehensive wellthought-out general social policy regarding open access. However, such
a general social policy is unlikely to emerge for several reasons. First,
Congress is unlikely to ever tackle open access questions as a general
category. This is simply not the way legislation emerges. Rather, discrete
examples of open access questions percolate up through the legislative
process and are debated and acted upon in specific contexts-network
neutrality for the Internet and telecommunications regulation being recent examples. When regulatory structures are created to implement
specific access regimes, they rarely involve cross-disciplinary contact and
learning. The structure of mixed state and federal regulation for many
of these areas makes a consistent and comprehensive regulatory ap73
proach even more unlikely.

Antitrust and Regulation] (arguing for analysis of whether regulatory alternative would prevent anticompetitive behavior); Andrew I. Gavil, ExclusionaryDistributionStrategies by Dominant Firms: Striking a Better Balance, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 3, 56-57 (2004) (criticizing dismissal
of Trinko at pleadings stage).
72
Albert A. Foer, Electricity:Notes on the TransitionPhase,33 Loy. U. CHI. LJ. 813 (2002).
73
Along the same lines, a number of commentators have argued that the essential
facilities doctrine operates as a second-best solution to correcting overly expansive intellectual property rights. James Turney, Defining the Limits of the EU EssentialFacilitiesDoctrine
on Intellectual Property Rights: The Primacy of Securing Optimal Innovation, 3 Nw. J. TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. 179, Parts II.B, IV (2005) (arguing that EU essential facilities doctrine cases
involving intellectual property rights "concerned dubious claims to exclusivity" or the "dubious existence of the intellectual property right"); Thomas F. Cotter, IntellectualProperty
and the EssentialFacilitiesDoctrine,44 ANTITRUST BULL. 211 (1999); Gilbert & Shapiro, supra
note 4, at 12750, 12755 (critiquing use of essential facilities doctrine as proxy for defining
scope of intellectual property right); McGowan, supra note 4, at 850-51 (arguing antitrust, generally, and essential facilities doctrine in particular, is ill suited to calibrate optimum level of intellectual property protection). But cf, Amy Rachel Davis, Note, Patented
Embryonic Stem Cells: The Quintessential"EssentialFacility"?94 GEO. LJ. 205 (2005) (arguing
that essential doctrine provides superior and more realistic alternatives to redrawing
boundaries of intellectual property rights); Elizabeth A. Nowicki, Competition in the Local
Telecommunications Market: Legislate or Litigate, 9 HARv. J.L & TECH. 353 (1996) (making
same argument in telecommunications industry prior to enactment of 1996 Telecommunications Act).
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Whether the legislature and/or regulatory agencies address open access piecemeal or comprehensively, they still need a framework in which
to do so. While we believe that the judiciary can adequately implement
an infrastructure theory of essential facilities in the overwhelming majority of cases, 74 we also believe it provides a strong framework for appli75
cation in other institutional settings as well.
More importantly, we do not live in a regulatory age: quite the opposite. Deregulation is the spirit of the age, with most deregulatory impulses relying heavily on competitive markets and the role of antitrust as
a substitute for traditional regulation. 76 Over and over, the mantra has
been to substitute general antitrust principles for sector specific regulation. Antitrust has even been referred to as "light regulation." 77 While
this is frequently an improvement on traditional utility regulation, one
cannot argue in good faith for both deregulation and also the disabling
of the courts from enforcing the antitrust rules that were part of the
bargain for deregulation in the first place.
74 See infra Part W.A.
75 See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 388 (1999) (alluding to similarity of

essential facilities doctrine and Congressional access requirements in 1996 Telecommunications Act). Justice Breyer's concurrence alludes to potential application of essential facilities doctrine in same context. Id. at 428; see also Piropato, supra note 48, at 369
(recommending the FCC adopt guidelines for open access in telecommunication based
on the essential facilities doctrine); Donna M. Gitter, The Conflict in the European Community Between Competition Law and IntellectualProperty Rights: A Cal for Legislative Clarification
of the EssentialFacilitiesDoctrine, 40 AM. Bus. L.J. 217 (2003) [hereinafter A Callfor Legislative Clarification].
76 See e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST (2005); RUDOLPH

J.R. PERITZ,

COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA

1888-1992:

HISTORY, RHETORIC, LAW

262-64

(1996) (analyzing rhetoric of deregulatory movement); GILES H. BURGESS, JR. THE EcONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST (1995); ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS

(1988); Dennis W. Carlton & Randal C. Picker,

Antitrust and Regulation (John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 312 (2d Series),
2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=937020. For examples of this argument in
industry-specific contexts, see, e.g., Ex Parte Filing of the U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Broadband
Industry Practices, WC Dkt. No. 07-52, 2007 WL 4227354 (FCC, Sept. 6, 2007) ("The FCC
should be highly skeptical of calls to substitute special economic regulation of the Internet for free and open competition enforced by the antitrust laws."); Christopher S.
Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, 19 I-ARv. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2005); Symposium, Competition,
Consumer Protection and Energy Deregulation, 33 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 749 (2002); Robert D.
Atkinson & Philip J. Weiser, A "Third Way" on Network Neutrality, INFORMATION TECH. &
INNOVATION FOUND., May 30, 2006, at 1, http://www.itif.org/files/netneutrality.pdf; (calling for the FCC to police exclusionary conduct by networks through an antitrust-like approach); PhilipJ. Weiser, Toward A Next Generation Regulatory Strategy, 35 Loy. U. CHI. L.J.
41 (2003) [hereinafter Toward A Next Generation Regulatory Strategy] (same).
77 Daniel L. Cendan, Filling the Gaps: A PrincipledApproach to Antitrust Enforcement Provides a Necessary Complement to the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1755,
1780, 1787 (2003); Robert H. Lande, Professor Waller's Un-American Approach to Antitrust, 32
Loy. U. CHI. LJ. 137, 144 (2000); Spencer Weber Waller, Market Talk: Competition Policy in
America, 22 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 435, 452 n.35 (1997).
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The very nature of courts as generalist institutions may be a strength
and not a detriment in guaranteeing open access in appropriate cases.
Judges (at least federal judges with life tenure) may have individual
predilections and biases, but they are institutionally protected from the
kind of concerns that have spawned the capture theory and public
choice literature analyzing the tendency of legislatures and regulatory
agencies to favor the interests of concentrated organized minorities with
a great deal at stake over the more diffuse, less intense interests of the
general public, even if the unorganized masses hold a greater aggregate
stake in a dispute.7"
The question of the correct rule for requiring open access is partially
intertwined with the question of which institution (legislatures, regulators, courts, elections, markets, or other social arrangements) should enforce the rule. 79 However, infrastructure theory can help whichever
institution ends up being assigned the task of deciding these questions.
V. RESPONDING TO THE CRITICS
Despite its venerable lineage, the essential facilities doctrine is out of
favor with a wide variety of legal and economic commentators.80 Most of
the serious criticisms can be grouped into three categories: First, the
doctrine leaves consumers no better off;81 second, application of the
doctrine creates undesirable incentives for the incumbent, the new entrant, or both; and third, the doctrine cannot be meaningfully applied
by a generalist federal district court judge. In this Part, we respond to
these criticisms.
A.

EFFECTS ON CONSUMER WELFARE

Critics of the essential facilities doctrine maintain that consumers gain
nothing when a court forces a monopolist to provide access to essential
facilities. Competitors refused access may gain access, but they will be
charged the monopoly price in any event, and that price will be passed
on to consumers (as it would if the doctrine did not apply). As the price
paid by consumers remains the same, so does the quantity of goods or
78 See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRicKE,, PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION
(1991); MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE

THEORY OF GROUPS (1965).
79 See infra Part W.A.
80 See sources cited supra note 21.
sI AREEDA

& HOVENKAMP,

ANTITRUST LAw,

supra note 21, at 171-72; see Gerber, supra

note 21, at 1084 (single monopoly rent critique of the essential facilities doctrine);
Ratner, supra note 21, at 361 (same).
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services consumed, and infrastructure capacity as well. s2 So, for example,
this view suggests that requiring nondiscriminatory access in Terminal
Railroadmay increase the number of railroads using the bridge and terminal facilities, but it will not increase the number of passengers; the
passengers will simply be spread over more railroads.83
This view rests on the premise that, because access will not affect the
price for consumers (the monopoly price), it will not affect output in
terms of quantity or quality and thus will not affect consumer welfare.
However, this premise does not necessarily hold in the infrastructure
context.
Infrastructure theory supports open and nondiscriminatory access as
a remedy even if the incumbent firm charges a monopoly price.8 4 While
price clearly matters and a competitive price will produce more social
benefit than a monopoly price, even nondiscriminatory access at the
monopoly price helps-in two ways.
First, a nondiscrimination rule may increase access.8 5 Remember, the
question is whether to require nondiscriminatory access upon denial of
access by a monopolist which refuses to deal with a competitor/cus82 See id. Critics also point out that granting access in itself cannot expand capacity. We
agree and do not contend otherwise.
83 C.f E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw, POLICY AND PROCEDURE: CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 703 (5th ed. 2003):
One powerful argument against expansive use of the essential facility doctrine is
that it flies in the face of antitrust principles by turning the defendant into a
utility, but without appropriate agency regulation. For example, suppose that
the defendant owns a monopoly pipeline for which distribution costs are $5.00
per unit. Because the defendant is a monopolist, however, it charges $8.00 per
unit, building the overcharge into the price of the gas delivered through the
pipeline. Now the defendant is forced to share the pipeline with a rival. What
price will it charge? Clearly, if $8.00 is its profit maximizing price when it is
billing consumers directly, that will also be its profit-maximizing price when it
shares its space with a rival. As a result, output will be no higher and price no
lower.

That is to say, forced sharing does not improve the welfare of consumers, it only
makes room for another firm in the market.").
84For the narrow set of cases where infrastructure theory would support an essential
facilities claim, there is often much more involved in context that will constrain the monopolist's ability actually to charge the monopoly price-for example, existing regulation,
contractual (RAND-like) commitments, or even the EU's explicit concern with fair and
reasonable pricing. As noted in the text, price clearly matters and a competitive price will
produce more social benefit than a monopoly price. By constraining the distortionary
impact of a monopoly to (i) the facility market and (ii) the form of price, the essential
facilities doctrine may force a sort of transparency that provides better signals regarding
the need for price regulation (or even government provision/subsidization of infrastructure expansion).
85We have framed our argument mainly in terms of how to best allocate existing infrastructure but have not rested our argument on the idea that the essential facilities doc-
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tomer at any price. Requiring open access at whatever price the monopolist charges other current customers may increase the quantity of
output in the downstream market that it serves where, for example, the
competitor is a more innovative or efficient provider of the downstream
86
output. For example, if the railroads granted access on nondiscriminatory terms and have higher capacity railcars (or some other more efficient way to deliver services to customers) than the incumbents, who
may have sunk costs in less efficient delivery systems, then the price
charged to customers may well decrease and output may increase.
Economists maintain that, at least in "fixed proportions" cases, the
monopolist will take into account margins in downstream markets, set
its input price for facility access to maximize profit, which ensures that
the price in downstream markets charged to consumers is at the monopoly level, and thus capture the full monopoly profit.87 But, for infrastructure, margins likely vary across downstream markets-recall that by
definition, we are concerned with facilities that are inputs into a wide
variety of markets-and margins may be subject to dynamic change due
to innovation. These complications may raise the transaction costs for a
monopolist seeking to set input prices that lock in monopoly profits.
While a monopolist would presumably seek to adjust its prices to capture the competitors' cost savings (associated with the more efficient
technology), there very likely will be constraints on the monopolist's
ability to make such adjustments. 8 First, existing regulations, or even
contractual RAND-like commitments, might preclude such opportunistic adjustments.89 Second, where a pricing pattern already exists, a court
implementing a nondiscrimination rule may look to that pattern and be
trine will expand access or usage of existing infrastructure. We are concerned primarily
with the conditions of access and their impact on downstream markets and innovation.
86 Consider also MCI as the archetypical infrastructure case. AT&T simply refused to
provide MCI with access to its local loop at any price. If it granted access at the regulated
price, or even an unregulated monopoly price, the total long-distance telephony market
would be increased by the addition of new cheaper MCI microwave long-distance traffic
minus the loss of the more expensive hard wire AT&T long-distance calls forgone. Standard price theory predicts that there should be a net increase in output and consumer
welfare in this situation. But at the same time, if the net amount of long-distance traffic
increases, then by definition net local telephony also will increase because the local loop
is a component of every long-distance call as well and there is no evidence that customers
substitute long-distance for local calling. See Spencer Weber Waller, Areeda, Epithets and
Essential Facilities,2008 Wisc. L. REv. (forthcoming).
87 See, e.g., David Reiffen & Andrew N. Kleit, Terminal Railroad Revisited: Foreclosureof
an Essential Facility or Simple Horizontal Monopoly ?, 33 J.L. & EcoN. 419, 421-22 (1990).
88 Some might argue that a monopolist would attempt to set prices ex ante at levels
that account for potential cost savings associated with innovation in downstream markets,
but it may be prohibitively difficult to do so, especially across a range of downstream
markets.
89 The MCI case is a good example.
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unwilling to tolerate significant price increases, even though the defendant may claim a right to charge a monopoly price. Finally, transaction
and information costs alone might make such price increases by the monopolist unlikely. These considerations suggest that a nondiscrimination
rule for infrastructure may be an effective way to encourage decentralized innovation and competition in downstream markets by avoiding
centralized control by the monopolist.90
This leads to the second way in which nondiscriminatory access, even
at the monopoly price, can improve consumer welfare. Specifically, nondiscrimination can also affect the quality (type) of outputs in downstream markets. Assuming the monopoly price has been and will be
charged, allocation of access and usage of infrastructure capacity on a
nondiscriminatory basis may be beneficial where some range of the uses
generate spillovers. The rent obtained by the monopolist presumably
remains the same under the one monopoly rent theory; consumers potentially obtain a wider diversity of downstream outputs because the monopolist cannot restrict, prioritize, or discriminate among downstream
users; and society potentially benefits from the spillovers produced by
users.
The quality and diversity arguments raised above call into question
the assumption of "fixed proportions" that underlies the one monopoly
rent theory. When that assumption is relaxed, as we believe it often must
be for infrastructure, then the consumer welfare arguments in favor of
the essential facilities doctrine may be even stronger. 91
B.

THE QUESTION OF INCENTIVES

Critics have also focused on the question of incentives. They raise the
concern that an overly expansive application of the essential facilities
doctrine will reduce the incentives of the incumbent firm to invest in
90 See Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 3; Brett M. Frischmann & Barbara van
Schewick, Network Neutrality and the Economics of an Information Superhighway: A Reply to

Professor Yoo,

47JURIMETRICSJ.

283 (2007).

91There are a variety of exceptions to the "one monopoly rent" theory. For a recent
exposition and application to the Internet, see Barbara van Schewick, Towards an Economic
Frameworkfor Network Neutrality Regulation, 5 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 329 (2007),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=812991. It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss each of the exceptions, the relevant theoretical models, and limiting conditions. But
we will point out that (1) some of the important conditions for exceptions (scale economies, externalities in complementary markets, dynamic and uncertain innovation, etc.)
are commonly found in the mixed infrastructure context, and (2) many infrastructure
cases do not fit the "fixed proportions" scenario because of variance across downstream
markets. Of course, the one monopoly rent theory sets forth impossibility conditions for
anticompetitive harm, and fitting within the exceptions still leaves for consideration
whether the challenged conduct is pro- or anticompetitive.
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the facility in the first place, reduce the incentives for the unintegrated
competitor to seek to innovate or invent, encourage free riding on the
incumbent's facility instead, distort signals sent to future incumbents
and competitors, and generally decrease welfare. 92 These are fair concerns, but, like many of the criticisms of the essential facilities doctrine,
are either overblown or more properly applied to an essential facilities
doctrine unanchored to the concept of infrastructure.
1. Incumbent Incentives
The incentives of the incumbent firm are far more complex than
most critics contend. The essential facilities doctrine, properly applied,
prevents the incumbent firm from unlawfully acquiring or maintaining
a monopoly in the market where it faces, or potentially faces, competition. This can promote innovation, rather than retard it, in either the
incumbent's market constituting the infrastructure or that of the competitors or users. 93 This was the essence of MCI's claim in the private
antitrust case, and the Department of Justice's claim in the government
case against the old AT&T. MCI with its microwave transmission system
was the Schumpterian innovator, not AT&T, which was using its control
over the local loop to fight off potential competition in the long-distance market.

94

At times, essential facilities are not productive at all, but merely act as
gatekeepers or bottlenecks. The incumbent lives off of the productive
activities of others that take place downstream by extracting rents that
92

AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 21, at § 773e; Mats A. Bergman, The Role of the
EssentialFacilitiesDoctrine,46 ANTITRUST BULL. 403, 421-22 (2001); Kezsbom & Goldman,
supra note 21, at 2; Hylton, supra note 21, at 1261-62; Marquardt & Leddy, supranote 21,
at 863; Lipsky & Sidak, supra note 21, at 1219; Piropato, supra note 48, at 406; Werden,
supra note 21, at 473; Gilbert & Shapiro, supra note 4, at 12753-54; McGowan, supra note
4, at 804-06.
93 See Cyril Ritter, Refusals to Deal and "EssentialFacilities".Does IntellectualProperty Require
Special Deference Compared to Tangible Property?,28 WORLD COMPETITION 281, 296-97 (2005),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=726683; Jonathan B. Baker, Promoting Innovation
Competition Through the Aspen/Kodak Rule, 7 GEO. MASON L. REv. 495 (1999); Piropato,
supranote 48, at 407 (arguing that without open access, many smaller companies will not
get the opportunity to innovate so as to refine or actually better the initial technology);
Robert Pitofsky, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Prepared Remarks, Antitrust Analysis in
High-Tech Industries: A 19th Century Discipline Addresses 21st Century Problems (Feb.
25-26, 1999), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/pitofsky/hitch.htm.
94A similar story can be told about AT&T's use of its control of the local loop to
prevent the introduction of competition in the market for peripherals and equipment.
United States v. AT&T Co., 524 F. Supp. 1336 (D.D.C. 1981). See generally Roger Noll &
Bruce Owen, The Anticompetitive Uses of Regulation: United States v. AT&T, in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION (John E. Kwoka & Lawrence J. White eds., 1989); THE AT&T SETrLEMENT: TERMs EFFECTS PROSPECTS (1982); THE BRE-AKUP OF AT&T: OPPORTUNITIES
PROSPECTS CHALLENGES (Reuben B. Robertson & Richard E. Wiley eds., 1982).
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the downstream producers or upstream suppliers need for their own
95
proper incentives. Such bottlenecks should be discouraged.
Most incumbents will have sufficient incentives to invest in the facility
in the first place. 96 The critics are correct, though, that the proper perspective is ex ante, rather than ex post.9 7 They fail to acknowledge, however, that most essential facilities, or infrastructure in our terminology,
rarely arise fully formed. As a recent commentator has noted: "'Essential
facilities' do not necessarily result from substantial investments or risktaking but are often government-sanctioned infrastructure or weak intellectual property rights.""
Most also arise over time, allowing the incumbent to reap sufficient
returns to justify the initial investment and risk taking. In other situations, the incumbent will have full incentives in the primary market, and
an open access requirement involving a secondary market will have no
effect at all on those incentives.99 In addition, the frequent presence of
past or present regulation in connection of the essential facilities doctrine means that the question of recoupment for the initial investment
normally has been already addressed or achieved. 00

95See Davis, supra note 73, at 209-15 (hypothetical discussion how patent on essential
facility for embryonic stem cell technique chokes off downstream innovation); cf Gerber,
supra note 21, at 1074. In addition, the acquisition or denial of access to an essential
facility could also be part of a deliberate predatory strategy of raising the costs of the rivals
to the incumbent firm. See Hylton, supra note 21, at 1262-66; Gilbert & Shapiro, supra
note 4, at 12751 ("This 'two-level entry' requirement may raise the cost of entry into the
final product."). See generally Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive
Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power Over Price,96 YALE L.J. 209, 230-49 (1986).
96 The question of incentives is of course highly particularized. IMS, the respondent in
the EU competition case involving access to its data brick structure in Germany, competes
in the United States, Canada, and Australia, where copyright protection is not available,
and continues to compete in the United Kingdom even after it granted a perpetual, nonexclusive, royalty-free license as part of a settlement of a separate competition case. Gitter,
A Call for Legislative Clarification, supranote 75, at 291-92. While Gitter is correct that one
needs to be mindful of the effect of the EU case, not just on IMS, but on other similarly
situated incumbents and competitors, id. at 292, it is unproven what lessons such firms
would draw from this complex picture. The IMS case is discussed in greater detail infra
Part VI.F.
97See e.g.,
Bergman, supra note 92, at 422-23.
98
Ashwin Van Rooijen, The Role of Investments in Refusals to Dea4 31 WORLD COMPETITION 63 (2008).
99For example, in the Magill case in the European Union, several commentators have
noted that requiring the television stations to license their program information should
have no effect on their incentives to produce the television programming in the first
place. Gitter, A Call for Legislative Clarification, supra note 75, at 252-53 & n.67 (citing
sources). We discuss Magill in greater detail infra Part VI.F.
100
Hylton, supra note 21, at 1268.
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The application of the essential facilities doctrine does not preclude
the dominant firm from continuing to receive a return, even a monopoly return, on that investment. It merely requires access to competitors
on nondiscriminatory terms, lest the downstream producers be choked
off and society deprived of the resulting spillovers. Thus, nothing in the
essential facilities doctrine, or antitrust law in general, would preclude
the incumbent firm from charging a monopoly price.' 0' Similarly, nothing would also preclude the body politic from setting the price in such a
way as to compensate the incumbent for its sunk costs or to create the
proper incentives for investors as a whole. 0 2 Society may also choose to
subsidize the creation or maintenance of the infrastructure to cover
sunk costs and create the ex ante incentives for investment. In addition,
there are many models of public-private partnerships for the construction and operation of infrastructure that also address the sunk cost
problem. Any of these alternatives would reduce, if not eliminate, the
03
need for price discrimination in order to recover sunk costs.
The proper question is not whether the potential application of the
essential facilities doctrine, or any legal regime, has some effect on innovation and investment decisions, but whether the legal regime provides
sufficient incentives for societally beneficial investment and innovation to
proceed. 04 This is a recurring question in many areas of the law, particularly intellectual property. 0 5 Numerous commentators have sought to
quantify whether patent and copyright law provides too little, too much,
or the proper amount of incentives to generate the innovation that is at
the heart of granting intellectual property protection in the first place.
Most conclude that the answer is indeterminate and highly situationspecific. 0 6
101LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST 129 (1st ed. 1977); Troy, supra note 21, at 476.
102See Piropato, supra note 48, at 372.
103 Limiting the essential facilities doctrine to infrastructural assets also addresses the
other issue frequently raised with respect to price discrimination. Critics point out, correctly, that price discrimination may increase output by expanding sales to price-sensitive
customers. See Gilbert & Shapiro, supra note 4, at 12751. However, in the case of infrastructure the essential facility is by definition an input into a wide array of non-market
goods where market demand is not properly manifested, making it difficult to determine
who are the price-sensitive customers. See supra Part II.B.3.
104 Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 3, at 276.
105Id. at 278.
106See, e.g., Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, supra note 1, at
1065-66 & nn.136 & 137 (2005) (discussing studies); Peter S. Menell, IntellectualProperty:
General Theories, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAw AND ECONOMICS 130 (Boudewijn Bouckaert &
Gerrit de Geest eds., 1999) (surveying studies); INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEVELOPMENT: LESSONS FROM RECENT ECONOMIC RESEARCH (Carsten Fink & Keith E. Maskus eds.,
2005) (collecting studies); LANDES & POSNER, supra note 1, at 422-23. Menell notes that
"[t]aken together, these studies suggest a growing consensus among economists that in-
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Finally, certain facilities may cease to constitute infrastructure as technological change and other exogenous factors create new paths of access, freeing the incumbent from any obligation to serve all comers on
nondiscriminatory terms. 107 More simply put, items can both become
and cease to be infrastructure over time. Local telephony is one example of a network that eventually became infrastructural over time and
may cease to be in the future as a result of technological developments,
most notably wireless telephony and Voice over Internet Protocols
(VoIP). The possibility that for a period of the lifespan of the facility the
incumbent will have to serve all comers, and still be compensated for it,
should thus rarely affect investment decisions where the prospect of in10 8
frastructure status lies in an undetermined and uncertain future.
Any negative effects on investments (and we concede that the effect is
likely to be small but greater than zero) must nonetheless be balanced
against the downstream externalities that result from access to the infrastructure that is created.109 We seek to balance the benefits and incentives of unconstrained private property rights with the needs and
resulting benefits of society as a whole. Neither traditional nor intellectual property is unconditional nor unconstrained. 0 All other legal rules
have some effect on property and incentives but do so when societal
needs require something other than unrestrained business freedom.
We require open, but paid-for, access in the limited group of cases
when significant downstream externalities exist but are difficult to measure. Our proposal seeks to make more rigorous an existing regime that
expresses the constant balancing and limits already present in the law.

tellectual property rights offer a real, but limited, incentive to innovate in some industrial
sectors, the importance of such rights vary significantly across industries and fields of
innovation and the linkage between intellectual property rights and social welfare improvement is extraordinarily complex." Menell, supra, at 136. Similarly, the literature on
whether competitive or monopolistic markets are more conducive to innovation is similarly indeterminate. See Michael L. Katz & Howard A. Shelanski, Mergers and Innovation, 74
ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 18-19 (2007) (surveying literature). But seeJonathan B. Baker, Beyond
Schumpeter vs. Arrow, How Antitrust Fosters Innovation, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 575, 583-86
(2007).
107See Lipsky & Sidak, supra note 21, at 1216 (arguing that if doctrine is to recognized,
it should be temporally limited).
108Anecdotally, we note that the popularity of the successful privatization and commercialization of even traditional infrastructure suggests that the private sector currently
views such investments highly favorably and with more than enough incentives for investors. See Buttonwood: Road Runners, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 20, 2007, at 31, availableat http:/
/www.economist.com/finance/displaystory.cfm?story-id=8565029.
109Critics of the essential facilities doctrine raise the specter of negative incentive effects of requiring access, but those effects are speculative and not quantified.
110See generally Michael A. Carrier, CabiningIntellectual Property Through a Property Paradign, 54 DUKE L.J. 1 (2004).
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2. Challenger Incentives
Our focus on the infrastructural nature of the facility, rather than the
necessity of the plaintiff, also responds to the second concern that the
unintegrated competitors will merely seek to appropriate the investment
of their predecessors rather than seeking to blaze their own trails. Our
infrastructure lens means that in the vast majority of cases there will be
economic and legal barriers to the duplication of the facility, rather
than a free-rider story being played out. Many of the infrastructural assets already discussed have sufficient natural monopoly characteristics
that it is not societally beneficial to duplicate the facility. These include
the local phone loop, the local electrical transmission network in the
1970s, and any other partially regulated infrastructural entity where entry is restricted legally, undesirable under natural monopoly theory, or
impossible as a practical matter.
The vast majority of the existing case law already is acutely aware of
these concerns, which frequently form the expressed basis, or at least
the background atmospherics, for rejecting specious claims by plaintiffs.
Such concerns more properly form the basis for rejecting a particular
plaintiff's claim or distinguishing a free rider from a legitimate essential
facilities doctrine claimant. How else to explain the myriad cases where
the courts have relatively easily rejected the plaintiff's claims to access
the defendant's distribution or advertising facilities, telling those plaintiffs to do it themselves?"'
3. NondiscriminatoryAccess
An additional issue relating to incentives has been to challenge the
requirement of access on nondiscriminatory terms. Critics suggest that
allowing the incumbent monopolist to price discriminate may allow
more efficient use of the downstream resources by channeling use toward the most efficient and most intensive users and preventing lower
intensity users from being priced out of the market altogether."'
There are several responses to this argument. First, the theoretical
possibility, but real-world absence of, perfect price discrimination renders part of the argument a red herring. Truly perfect price discrimination would be efficiency enhancing, but it simply does not exist in the
real world. Second, economists are of mixed opinions on the welfare

III See supra notes 17-18, infra notes 174-78, and accompanying text.
Il

See Hylton, supra note 21, at 1272-73.
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effects of imperfect discrimination." 3 In fact, we recognize there may be
a trade-off between the benefits of a nondiscriminatory access rule and
the potential benefits of price discrimination. However, the special characteristics of infrastructure justify eliminating price discrimination as a
possible justification for the monopolization of these societally valuable
assets. Third, congestion or usage based pricing need not be discriminatory. Thus, intensity of use can be accounted for on a nondiscriminatory
basis. The real issue is whether prioritization of access leads to the most
114
efficient allocation of scarce resources.
As discussed aboveY 5 we would require nondiscriminatory access for
commercial infrastructure only to the extent of granting entrants access
equal to that enjoyed by the incumbent or its users. If the incumbent
happened to impose some form of price discrimination on its existing
affiliates or customers, then the incumbent would be required to grant
access to the new entrant on no less favorable terms but would not be
required to eliminate any existing distinctions between classes of customers or uses.
For public, social, and mixed infrastructure, we have also indicated
why open access requires more-i.e., access on true nondiscriminatory
terms, no less favorable than granted to any other user. The information
and transaction cost problems that make imperfect price discrimination
troubling and perfect price discrimination impossible are only worsened
where the users' market demand falls short of social demand.
The critics' concerns over nondiscriminatory access diminish in importance when applied to infrastructure within the meaning of our theory. By definition, we apply an open access regime to those assets that
are inputs for the production of social and public goods where demand
is not properly manifested in the market. There would be no practical
way for the incumbent controlling the essential infrastructure to know

113DENNIS W.

CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL

ORGANIZATION

448-50 (1990).
114 See Frischmann & van Schewick, supra note 90, at 403-06:
While we occasionally employ congestion pricing to alleviate congestion on infrastructure, such as major highways during peak load times, these pricing
mechanisms (1) are the exception rather than the rule, (2) tend to be either flat
fees or usage-sensitive fees that vary based on the time of day or actual crowding
effects, or both, and (3) do not employ "Coasean proxies" that differentiate
among users based on their identity, destination, or activity at their final destination. Thus, where congestion pricing of infrastructure access has been employed, it has been implemented in a manner that sustains the infrastructure
commons.
Id. at 405.
115 See supra Part II.C.1.
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who would be the high-volume, high-value downstream users or the lowvolume low-intensity users for purposes of price discrimination. To be
more concrete, an incumbent controlling a software platform deemed
to be infrastructure would have no way of knowing which users would
use the platform for societally beneficial purposes and which would
not.116 In the absence of such knowledge, there is no way to price access
to the infrastructure to maximize the downstream spillovers that justify
the open access regime in the first place.
Moreover, the private sector recognizes the need for nondiscriminatory open access in an area closely analogous to the essential facilities
doctrine. In the standards-setting area, competitors jointly select an industry standard-which can be a process, technology, or platform-for
producing a resulting downstream product or products. Industry standards can be unilaterally established or jointly created. They can be explicitly selected through an agreed-upon process or simply evolve over
time. Examples include standardized sizes for railroad track, the formats
for DVDs and compact disks, or the technology for producing environmentally friendly gasoline and other petroleum derivatives. Once the
industry standard has been selected, it is for all intents and purposes an
essential facility, since existing producers or new entrants will be required to use that standard in order to produce saleable goods or services. In many cases, such industry standards will also constitute infrastructure within the meaning of our theory, depending on the nature of
the downstream use and the resulting spillovers.
In most of these settings, reasonable and nondiscriminatory (RAND)
licensing is the norm. 7 Most standard-setting organizations require
RAND licensing terms once the industry standard has been selected." 8
While the question of the reasonableness of the resulting licensing
terms is frequently controversial," 9 few, if any, question the need for
116See Frischmann & Lemley, Spillovers, supra note 3, at 258-60 (discussing invention of
spreadsheet and telephone, and resulting but unpredictable downstream uses).
117 CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RuLEs: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE
NETWORK ECONOMY 16 (1999) ("[P]articipation in most formal standard-setting bodies in
the United States requires a commitment to license any essential or blocking patents on
'fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms'"); Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property
Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations,90 CAL. L. REv. 1889, 1904 (2002) (2002 survey
indicating that 29 out of 36 standards-setting organizations use RAND licensing terms).
118SeeJoseph Scott Miller, Standard Setting, Patents, and Access Lock-In: RAND Licensing
and the Theory oftheFirm, 40 IND. L. REv. 351 (2007); Damien Geradin, Standardization and
Technological Innovation: Some Reflections on Ex-Ante Licensing, FRAND, and the Proper Means
to Reward Innovators, 29 WORLD COMPETITION 511, 512 (2006), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=909011.
119See George W. Jordan III, How to Avoid RAND Disputes, MANAGING INTELL. PROP.,
Apr. 2006, http://www.managingip.com/Article.aspx?ArticlelD=1254684.
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nondiscriminatory access once an industry has settled on a particular
standard. Indeed, antitrust investigations and litigation have ensued
when firms seek to manipulate standard-setting processes to obtain control of the industry standard and to use it to deny reasonable access to
competitors.120
4. Avoiding Collusion
The final incentives issue raised by critics relates to a very different
concern. A number of commentators have questioned the propriety of
granting mandatory access to an incumbent's facility on the grounds
that sharing will create incentives for collusion between the incumbent(s) and the challenger.'21 Most critics present this as a theoretical
concern, without any actual examples of where this has come to pass.
While such a result is possible, it seems unlikely for several related
reasons.
First, if the incumbent wanted to collude with the challenger, it would
have presumably granted access and not denied it in the first place. Second, the urge to collude should not be irresistible once access is
granted. After all, access and the resulting sharing is publicly known and
frequently subjected to at least partial regulatory control. This is hardly
the best forum to engage in collusion. Such illegal collusion in publicly
scrutinized, open joint activity is hard to conceal. Such collusion would
tend to be per se illegal and subject to the strictest criminal penalties
and strict government and private enforcement. Both the incumbent
and the new entrants would have every incentive to defect from the collusive scheme under the government's amnesty and leniency program. 22 Third, any potential for collusive or oligopolistic behavior as a
result of mandatory access could be lessened through the imposition of
120
Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2007); Opinion of the
Commission, Rambus, Inc., FTC No. 9032 (2006), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/
adjpro/d9302/060802commissionopinion.pdf; Decision and Order, Union Oil Co. of
Cal., FTC No. 9305, 2005 WL 2003365 (Aug. 2, 2005); Dell Computer Corp., 121 F.T.C.
616 (1996) (consent order). See generallyJames B. Kobak, Jr., StandardSetting, IP and Antitrust, 867 PLI/PAT 187 (2006); Christopher L. Sagers, Antitrust Immunity and Standard Setting Organizations:A Case Study in the Public-PrivateDistinction, 25 CARDozo L. Rav. 1393
(2004).
121AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 21, § 772c4; Hylton, supra note 21, at 1252-54.
122
Under the Department of Justice's amnesty and leniency program, a corporation
will be immune from prosecution if the following six conditions are met:
1. At the time the corporation comes forward to report the illegal activity, the
Division has not received information about the illegal activity being reported
from any other source;
2. The corporation, upon its discovery of the illegal activity being reported, took
prompt and effective action to terminate its part in the activity;
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the kind of conditions frequently employed in lawful joint ventures
and similar
where the parties have similar opportunities for interaction
123
operations.
other's
each
about
information
to
access
In sum, a narrowly tailored essential facilities doctrine focused on
infrastructure should not create any significant negative incentives,
free-riding problems, or increases in the likelihood of collusion between
incumbents and new challengers. Properly applied, it should maintain
sufficient incentives for innovation and increase the likelihood of innovations both by new entrants and downstream users.
C. COURTS AS DECISION MAKERS

Professor Hovenkamp, Judge Posner, and other critics rely heavily on
questions of administrability as grounds for jettisoning the essential facilities doctrine. 2 4 According to them, either Type I errors (false positives) will overwhelm Type II errors (false negatives) and procompetitive
behavior will be unduly deterred, or else the courts will be forced to act
as a long-term regulator, setting price and other terms of access that

3. The corporation reports the wrongdoing with candor and completeness and
provides full, continuing, and complete cooperation to the Division throughout
the investigation;
4. The confession of wrongdoing is truly a corporate act, as opposed to isolated
confessions of individual executives or officials;
5. Where possible, the corporation makes restitution to injured parties; and
6. The corporation did not coerce another party to participate in the illegal
activity and clearly was not the leader in, or originator of, the activity.
U.S. Dep't of Justice, Corporate Leniency Policy (1993), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0091.pdf. In addition the corporation's employees
will receive similar immunity from prosecution if they truthfully cooperate with the government as well. However, the firm receiving amnesty is not immune from civil antitrust
litigation, but is subject only to single, rather than treble, damages. See id.
123 See Gen. Motors Corp., 103 F.T.C. 374 (1984) (consent decree). The one scenario
most likely to generate potential collusive incentives seems to be of the least interest to
those who raise this concern. Oddly enough, critics of mandatory access frequently find
the essential facilities doctrine, or its equivalents, less troubling in the context of joint
control of the facility. Under these circumstances, the prospect for collusion already exists
for the joint operators of the essential facilities and is only enhanced by admitting a new
challenger otherwise predisposed to compete upstream or downstream with the operators
of the bottleneck facility. Most critics of the essential facilities doctrine do not seem bothered by this scenario. An infrastructure theory of essential facilities would not focus on
whether the facility was individually orjointly operated but how it is used downstream and
the benefits society derives from a regime of open access.
124See HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE, supra note 21, at 237; RcHARD A. Pos.
NER, ANTITRUST LAw 242 (2d ed. 2001); Gilbert & Shapiro, supra note 4, at 12754-55.
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they are ill-equipped to do. 2 5 Better then to do nothing, and let the
26
market correct what it can, or defer to more expert regulators.
While this is a superficially appealing set of arguments, they ultimately
are not persuasive. Where are the Type I errors haunting the system?
Where are the courts acting as regulators beyond their institutional capacities under this doctrine? The task of a court deciding an essential
facilities case pales in comparison to courts administering complex consent decrees in other aspects of antitrust law, including the government
antitrust litigation against AT&T, which resulted in the modification of
final judgment (MFJ) administered by Judge Harold Greene over a
twelve-year period in which he functioned as a "one man Federal Te127
lephony Commission.'
There is no reason to think that deciding or administering the average essential facilities antitrust case is beyond the capacity of the average
federal judge. For example, in Trinko, the basic question of whether Verizon was, or was not, providing access to its competitors on terms less
favorable than it did to its own local customers is a straightforward question of discrimination amounting to roughly: Is X being treated less favorably than y?128
This is a basic binary type of determination that federal and state
courts decide on a daily basis in both statutory and common law cases
involving civil rights, employment discrimination, common carrier duties, licensing decisions, school segregation, prison conditions, access to
health care, and numerous other areas of the law beyond antitrust.
These are dime-a-dozen types of decisions that are a far cry from the
125Ratner, supra note 21, at 376-82.
126
HOVENKAmP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE,

supra note 21, at 237. See generally Ronald

A. Cass & Keith N. Hylton, Preserving Competition: Economic Analysis, Legal Standards and
Microsoft, 8 GEO. MASON L. REv. 1, 30-33 (1999) (arguing that, in general, Type II errors
promote market competition in long run while Type I errors create incentives to avoid
competition and seek court relief).
127STUART MINOR BENJAMIN ET AL., TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY

681 (lst ed.

2001);Jim Chen, Titanic Telecommunications, 25 Sw. U. L. REv. 535, 536 (1996) (MFJ defined the terms by which the telecommunications industry operated over the next twelve
years). See generally PETER W. HUBER ET AL., FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW §§ 4.4.3.2
to 4.4.4 (2d. ed. 1999) (summarizing Judge Greene's administration of the MFJ).
128Nearly at the same time as the Supreme Court, with the support of the antitrust
enforcement agencies, was restricting the essential facilities doctrine in the telecommunications field, the U.S. government successfully brought an essential facilities doctrine-type
claim in the World Trade Organization. In that matter, a dispute resolution panel of the
WTO held that the Mexico wrongfully denied U.S. telecommunications firms access to
the Mexican long-distance telephony market and charged unlawfully high access fees.
Panel Report, Mexico-Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services, WT/DS152/R (Apr.
2, 2004), 2004 WL 742530.
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polycentric multivariate balancing-type of cases that courts are comparatively poorer at deciding. 12 9 If one concludes the courts cannot handle
this kind of dispute, then most of the federal court docket should be
discarded in favor of some other institutional dispute resolution
mechanism.
Critics of the essential facilities doctrine typically focus only on the
alleged shortcomings of the judiciary and rarely, if ever, on whether the
available alternatives in the real world will perform any better. Professor
Neil Komesar's theory of comparative institutional analysis examines the
effect of large numbers of affected persons and complexity on the ability
of courts, markets, political processes, and informal communities to decide issues free from either majoritarian or minoritarian biases. 3 ' His
central insight is that all of these institutions degrade as decision makers
as numbers and complexity grows, requiring difficult choices among less
3
than perfect alternatives.' '
The courts have, in fact, proved themselves quite adept at making
these sorts of decisions in right-to-access antitrust cases, whether called
essential facilities cases or not. Even the Trinko Court acknowledged that
the courts have adequately handled such disputes under the rubric of
Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 3 2 When the essential facilities doctrine
has been explicitly used by the lower courts, they have been equally adept at sorting out the meritorious cases from the frivolous cases where a
competitor could reasonably duplicate the facility in question but simply
preferred not to go to the trouble and expense.
For example, MCI distinguished between access to intra-city networks
and inter-city networks in which MCI was free to build its own facilities
and was not given access to AT&T's existing competitive facilities. 133 The
quick rejection of most essential facilities claims at the pleading or sumI2 Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. REv. 353, 394-404
(1978). Professor Fuller's article was published posthumously. An unpublished version
was in circulation as early as the 1950s and was included in the tentative 1958 edition of
Hart and Sack's The Legal Process, itself not officially published until 1994. See generally
HENRY M. HART & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING
AND APPLICATION OF LAW (1994).
130 NEIL K. KOMESAR, LAW'S LIMITS: THE RULE OF LAw AND TH4E SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF

RIGHTS (2001) [hereinafter LAw's LIMITS]; NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES:
CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAw, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POICY (1994) [hereinafter IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES]. See also Owen, supranote 61, at 890-94 (comparing strengths and
weaknesses of courts and agencies in addressing essential facilities issues).
131KOMESAR, LAw's LIMITS, supra note 130, at 174-76; KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVEs, supra note 130, at 271-76.
132 Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 410
n.3 (2004).
13 MCI Commc'ns Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1147-50 (7th Cir. 1983).
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mary judgment stage suggests, if anything, that the courts are doing just
fine at separating the wheat from the chaff in this area. Unfortunately,
Trinko suggests that, in most circumstances, federal courts will never
even get the chance to do what they have been doing quite well for
decades because of a theoretical concern for false positives in a case that
did not even raise a credible fear of such an outcome.
Trinko further instructs us to be wary of adjudicating liability where no
adequate remedy can be implemented by the courts. This is a fair concern, but again one for which the courts have proved up to the challenge. It is also not clear whether Trinko or any other essential facilities
case raised any serious concern in this regard, certainly not with respect
to a request for damages. MCI and Aspen were also routine damage
cases, albeit treble damage ones because of the antitrust claims involved.
The mere fact that an injunction may be involved does not change
the picture. Most essential facilities cases involve a defendant that either
favors one competitor over another or provides more favorable access to
its upstream or downstream affiliate than it does to its competitor. The
injunctive remedy is a straightforward injunction to provide nondiscriminatory access.

13 4

In most cases, the court does not even have to formulate the terms of
access. They often already exist, either by reason of some regulatory decree by the appropriate government agency or the existing market
prices, or from the internal standards of the incumbent firms or firms.
As a thoughtful student commentator observed, the following five scenarios represent the vast majority of the situations faced in this regard:
(1) A single-firm monopolist that grants access to some customers
and not others;
(2) A monopoly controlled by concerted activity that grants access to
some customers and not others;
(3) A monopoly controlled by concerted action that allows use only
by co-owners of the facility;
(4) A single-firm monopolist that terminates all its existing customers
and takes over the market for itself; and
(5) A single-firm monopolist that is vertically integrated and that historically has been the only user of the essential facility. 135

134

Trinko, 540 U.S. at 410 n.3.

135Troy, supra note 21, at 485-87.
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In all but possibly the final scenario, the commentator concludes that
a
there are actual market prices or manageably easy ways to calculate 36
administer.
and
ascertain
comfortably
can
a
court
that
price
market
As another commentator has noted, the parties themselves should be
market mechanisms as long
able to reach agreement on price through
13 7
as governance costs are relatively low.
Even in the fifth example, where the most concern exists over the role
of the court as price setter, there has been a way out in the actual cases
raising this issue. For example in the Otter Tail case, the Court had the
benefit of the Federal Power Commission to set price and regulate acof the
cess. 3 8 Similarly, in Terminal Railroad, the Court had the3 benefit
9
Interstate Commerce Commission to act as a rate-setter.
The question for the courts is not whether the access standards are
correct in some cosmic sense. It is rather whether the competitor is being treated less favorably or unlawfully denied access at all. Depending
on the setting of the case, the court may require proof that the incumbent acted deliberately and/or that the difference in treatment was significant. These may or may not be complicated fact questions, but they
are by no means beyond the skills of the average jury-or beyond a fedinstructions and ensure that the
eral court's capacity to formulate jury
40
verdict is supported by the record.
One can imagine where problems at the remedy stage in antitrust or
other kinds of cases are so overwhelming that a court might be reluctant
to adjudicate liability. For example, a court might refuse to grant an
injunction that poses such problems by balancing the equities and public interest standards inherent in equitable relief. The court also could
at 485-86.
See Candeub, supra note 65, at 865-68.

136 Id.
137

Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 375-76 (1973).
139United States v. Terminal R.R Ass'n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383, 412 (1912).
140 What appears to really underlie much of the critique here is a discomfort with juries
deciding complex economic questions. See HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPISE, supra
note 21, at 61-63, 77-91, 307-08; Areeda, supra note 21, at 851. While the desirability of
juries deciding such questions is debatable, such criticism is really a separate argument
and foreclosed for the time being by precedent. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
444 U.S. 1093, 1095 (1980) (Justice Blackmun dissenting from the denial of certiorari)
("Kodak is entitled as a matter of constitutional right under the Seventh Amendment to
demand ajury trial in a case such as this. . ."); In re U.S. Fin. Secs. Litig., 609 F.2d 411, 432
(9th Cir. 1979) (rejecting complexity exception to Seventh Amendment). If the real objection is one of jury, rather than judicial, competence, then one intermediate solution
would be to characterize the question of the existence of an essential facility as a question
of law or a mixed question of law and fact and assigning it to the judge. See generally
RonaldJ. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, Essay, The Myth of the Law-Fact Distinction,97 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1769 (2003).
13
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issue a declaratory judgment and leave the decision as to remedy for
another day. 41 In the alternative, the court could proceed to a verdict,
and, if the plaintiff prevailed, appoint a special master or require a series of alternative dispute resolution proceedings for the parties to craft
acceptable private solutions.
For example, the European Union includes arbitration clauses in its
remedies in merger investigations that require open access requirements to essential facilities under the control of the merging firms. 42 In
addition, the private monitoring structure in the Microsoft consent decree and numerous consent decrees in U.S. merger practice often impose relief far more regulatory in nature than the relief sought in the
143
typical essential facilities case.
The final judicial remedy would, of course, be a contempt proceeding, as is the case with any defendant that has willfully violated the terms
of an injunction. The history of contempt proceedings in general and in
antitrust, including the Microsoft litigation, suggests that this is a high
hurdle, rarely attempted by the parties and even less frequently imposed
by the court. 144 Here, the high standard of proof inherently protects a
defendant and society at large from Type I errors and would be limited
to only the most drastic, and provable, situations that fall within the historic powers of the judicial system.
If traditional regulation is needed in a particular case, then let the
regulators regulate. However, in many cases, the judiciary will be handling essential facilities disputes in industries that are too small to have
an established regulatory structure, or where the regulatory scheme has
141 See e.g., Byars v. Bluff City News Co., 609 F.2d 843, 864 (6th Cir. 1979) (remanding
to district court but cautioning about imposing liability without workable remedy); General Motors Corp. (Crash Parts) (FTC 1982), 1977 FTC LEXIS 293 (expressing concern
over manageability of remedy).
The Second Circuit followed this type of cautious approach as to remedy in the Alcoa
case-a Section 2 Sherman Act case unrelated to the essential facilities doctrine. United
States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 445-48 (2d Cir. 1945). See generallySpencer
Weber Waller, The Story of Alcoa: The Enduring Questions of Market Power, Conduct, and Remedy in Monopolization Cases, in ANTITRUST STORIES (Eleanor M. Fox & Daniel A. Crane eds.,
2007) (discussing the court's imposition of liability for monopolization but deferral of a
remedy until after the completion of World War II).
142 GORDON BLANKE, THE USE AND UTILITY OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN EC COMMISSION MERGER REMEDIES: A NOVEL SUPRANATIONAL PARADIGM IN THE MAKING? (2006).
143 See Harry First & Andrew I. Gavil, Re-Framing Windows: The Durable Meaning of the
Microsoft Antitrust Litigation, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 641, 679 733-34 (2006) (describing technical compliance process under the Microsoft consent decree.
144 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (granting writ of
mandamus dissolving injunction and appointment of special master arising out of alternative remedy following denial of contempt citation for alleged violation of antitrust consent decree).
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failed to address a particular situation. 45 Here there is simply no alternative to a thoughtful judicial solution when a proper case or controversy
is presented for resolution.
When traditional regulatory mechanisms exist, creative solutions still
remain that do not disable a judicial remedy in the context of an antitrust dispute. Even the late Professor Phillip Areeda, generally a critic of
the essential facilities doctrine, conceded that "remedies may be practical ... when... a regulatory agency already exists to control the terms

of dealing. ' 146 Similarly, Professor Phillip Weiser has suggested that if a
federal court needs resources and expertise beyond its capabilities, it
should enlist state and47federal regulators as special masters to implement judicial decrees.1

The branches of government are separate but not hermetically sealed.
Critics and the Trinko Court may prefer to defer to the market, but they
fail to make the case that their normative preferences reflect the general
case rather than the special case. They fail to establish that their solution
in fact minimizes Type I rather than Type II errors, or that other solutions cannot bridge the gap when there is a meritorious antitrust case.
VI. INFRASTRUCTURE THEORY IN ACTION
We have presented our model thus far at a theoretical level. To make
our proposals concrete, we offer a series of examples of the application
of our infrastructure theory of the essential facilities doctrine to past,
present, and potential future controversies in the United States and the
European Union. We do so to argue that our model provides a coherent
and limited basis for determining whether an antitrust regime of open
access is needed, meaningfully limits both Type I and II errors, and can
be administered by courts in the vast majority of circumstances that are
likely to arise in the real world. In all our examples, both real and hypothetical, we assume that the defendant has true monopoly power and
focus on the question of whether the defendant's assets are infrastruc148
tural in nature, requiring a regime of open access.

145
Gerber, supra note 21, at 1102-03, 1108.
146 Areeda, supra note 21, at 853.
147
See generally Weiser, The Relationship of Antitrust and Regulation, supra note 71; Philip

J. Weiser, Goldwasser, The Telecom Act, and Reflections on Antitrust Remedies, 55
REv. 1 (2003).

ADMIN.

L.

148 This assumption eliminates the critical step of proving that the defendant is a true
monopolist but also eliminates the escape hatch in those essential facilities cases where
the plaintiff has access to other alternatives or could simply duplicate the facility on its

own. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
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SORTING OUT FALSE POSITIVES (MOUNTAINS AND Hoops)

Critics of the essential facilities doctrine have been concerned that
courts or juries will inexorably commit what is referred to as "Type I"
errors by condemning a variety of conduct that is not anticompetitive.
These criticisms are' usually expressed at a high level of generality. It is
not even always clear which cases critics believe were wrongly decided,
especially since some of the cases discussed do not use the essential facil149
ities doctrine by name.
We do not believe that this fear of false positives is a particularly telling one, since the lower courts have been quite restrictive in imposing
liability on this or related theories. As Professor Glenn Robinson has
noted, the lower courts have been far more parsimonious under the
essential facilities doctrine than the Supreme Court has in related
50
contexts.
Nonetheless, we also believe that infrastructure theory does a better
job than the prior tests for sorting out both the potential false positives
and false negatives. There are only a small number of cases imposing
liability that both appear to be false positives and that infrastructure theory would decide differently. These would include the Tenth Circuit decision in Aspen Skiing'5' and the handful of cases involving sports
52
stadiums.
1. The Aspen Litigation
Unlike the Supreme Court, which upheld the jury verdict in Aspen
Skiing on a more general monopolization theory, the Tenth Circuit
squarely grounded its decision on the essential facilities doctrine.151 In
Aspen Skiing, four originally independently owned ski resorts in the
Aspen valley created a joint lift ticket that allowed consumers to
purchase one ticket for the week and ski any of the mountains in Aspen.
It was both profitable and highly valued by consumers. Eventually, the
149See HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE, supra note 21, at 237; Fred S. McChesney, Talking 'Bout My Antitrust Generation:Competitionfor and in the Field of Competition Law,
52 EMORy L.J. 1401, 1415 (2003).
150Robinson, supra note 21, at 1231-32.
151Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 738 F.2d 1509 (10th Cir. 1984).
152Ferguson v. Greater Pocatello Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 848 F.2d 976 (9th Cir.
1988); Flip Side Productions, Inc. v.Jam Productions, Ltd., 843 F.2d 1024 (7th Cir. 1988);
Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F. 2d 520 (7th Cir. 1986); Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570
F.2d 982 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Elliott v. United Center, No. 95-C5440, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
1177 (N.D. Ill., Feb 2, 1996); Hart Prods., Inc. v. Greater Cincinnati Convention & Visitors
Bureau, 1990-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
69,233 (S.D. Ohio 1990).; U.S. Football League v.
Nat'l Football League, 634 F. Supp. 1155 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
153738 F.2d at 1519-22.
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defendant acquired control of three of the four mountains. The defendant shortly thereafter then imposed increasingly Draconian conditions
on its joint venture partner and later discontinued the arrangement altogether. The defendant refused to allow the plaintiff any access to lift
tickets to its mountains, even turning down cash for lift tickets at full
from cobbling together its
retail prices, in order to prevent the plaintiff
54
own version of the former joint lift ticket.
Applying the MCI test, the Tenth Circuit held that the evidence
presented on all four prongs of the test was sufficient to uphold the
denial of the defendant's motion for a directed verdict and judgment
notwithstanding the verdict. The court relied on the fact that the defendant owned three of the four mountains to establish the control of the
essential facility by a monopolist; it relied on the environmental restrictions on developing new ski areas to establish the inability to duplicate
the facility; the denial itself was uncontested; and it relied on the prior
course of dealing to establish the feasibility of access. The court concluded that "the substance of an essential facilities case was made," and
that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the jury verdict on these
55
grounds.'
The lower court version of Aspen may represent one of the few
straightforward examples of a case where the MCI test imposes liability
(or at least permits liability, given the defendant's concession on the
question of market power) and infrastructure theory would not. Infrastructure theory does not rely on the inconvenience suffered by the
plaintiff or the essentialness of the input to the plaintiff, but rather focuses on the societal need for open access to an input that enables the
production of potentially large, but often unmeasurable, spillovers or
downstream externalities benefiting society as a whole. Whether access
to a joint lift arrangement is "essential" to either competing ski operators or desirable to skiers simply is not the question. The question is
whether skiers or some other segment of the public use the input in a
fashion that produces benefits to society at large that the market inadequately values.

154 Id. at 1512-13. For reasons that are unknown, the defendant failed to appeal the
jury's finding that downhill skiing in Aspen was the relevant market at trial. The plaintiff
won a monopolization verdict totaling $7.5 million plus attorney's fees and costs after
trebling. On appeal, the defendant challenged various aspects of the jury instructions and
the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury's verdicts. The Tenth Circuit rejected
most of the defendant's points on appeal on the basis of waiver or the failure to demonstrate plain error.
155Id. at 1521.
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In Aspen, the answer is clear: Skiing is an end good by itself and produces no further downstream benefits or production other than perhaps the increased health and well-being of the skiers themselves.
Although pleasant for the vacationer, these benefits implicate none of
the broader societal concerns that underlie our interest in preserving a
properly cabined essential facilities doctrine. Thus, while there are
other reasons to uphold the Aspen Skiing verdict, as the Supreme Court
and others have identified, the essential facilities doctrine should not be
one of them.
2. Sports Stadiums
Of the handful of essential facilities cases involving sports stadiums,
Estate of Fishman v. Wirtz is representative of the main line of arguable
false positives under the essential facilities doctrine. 156 In Fishman, a losing bidder for the Chicago Bulls professional basketball team sued the
eventual winning group. A member of the winning group included the
owner of the Chicago Stadium, where the Bulls played. The owner of
the Chicago Stadium refused to lease the stadium to the plaintiffs
group, in turn causing the NBA Board of Governors to reject the plaintiff's contract to buy the team from the prior owners.
The Seventh Circuit, including two of the members of the MCI
panel,'57 held that the Chicago Stadium was an essential facility given
the more limited seating, age, and condition of the principal alternative
arena available for professional basketball. 58 Judge Easterbrook, however, wrote a strongly worded dissent arguing that the plaintiffs suffered
no antitrust injury; that the essential facilities doctrine had no application when one set of owners of a natural monopoly displaced a rival
group; and that the Chicago Stadium did not qualify as an essential facility in any event given other existing and eventual development of alter59
native stadiums in the Chicago metropolitan area.
While Fishman is a hard case under the traditional MCI test because of
the presence of at least one actual, but markedly less appealing, alternative stadium, and the possibility of future entry of new arenas, it is a
rather easy case using infrastructure theory. The question of whether
the Chicago Stadium is sufficiently unique to constitute an essential facility for antitrust purposes becomes irrelevant. It is clear that the old
Chicago Stadium did not constitute infrastructure within the meaning
Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1986).
157 Judges Cudahy and Fairchild were in the majority in both Fishman and MCI.
58
1 Fishman, 807 F.2d at 539-40.
156

159

Id. at 563-75.
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of our test. Consumption or use of the stadium cannot be considered
even potentially non-rivalrous over the intended real-world range of
uses. The circus and the Chicago Bulls cannot use the stadium at the
same time. 160 Once all tickets are sold for any particular event, there are
no more to be had. Moreover, the Chicago Stadium is not a general
purpose input for a wide variety of productive activities by its users. It is
merely an input for its tenants to present basketball games, hockey
games, concerts, the circus, and the like, and the venue for consumers
to enjoy such events. While such venues may be "essential" in some
sense because of the lack of readily available alternatives and the heavy
degree of necessary public approvals, subsidies, or outright public ownership, they are not "infrastructure" in the sense we identify as crucial to
the question of open access. The customers enjoy or "consume" the
event and do not engage in productive activities that yield substantial
positive externalities.

B.

161

TPNKo AND FALSE NEGATIVES

While Aspen in the lower courts and the line of stadium cases are
troubling under both our theory and most of the traditional critiques of
the essential facilities doctrine, they hardly justify jettisoning the doctrine. In fact, these cases suggest that an infrastructure theory can do a
betterjob in limiting Type I error than the linguistic formulations of the
past. One consequence may well be the shrinking of the application of
the essential facilities doctrine involving purely commercial infrastructure, at least where downstream demand considerations do not argue
for open access. But at same time, the doctrine necessarily expands liability in key cases involving other noncommercial types of infrastructure
where the likelihood of Type II error (false negative) is far more
prevalent.
Trinko appears to be a prototypical false negative case where infrastructure theory helps illustrate why open access is desirable. Telecommunications networks are partially non-rivalrous inputs into a wide
variety of market, non-market, and social activities. Downstream externalities should be clear. Voice and data communications are the principal platform for the exchange of ideas and other forms of human
creativity. While the centrality of wired local telephony is being chal160As a result of this fact, the Chicago Bulls and Chicago Blackhawks are forced to
schedule lengthy road trips each November while the successor to the Chicago Stadium is
rented to the circus, usually with disastrous consequences for their win-loss records.
161 While we can imagine a world where such venues become the site for the creative
interchange of ideas that would transform sports stadiums into the infrastructure of the
future, this simply is not the world in which we currently live or can reasonably foresee.
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lenged by other technologies, including wireless phone networks and
the Internet itself, the phone system remains a critical infrastructural
platform for the foreseeable future. 162 To hold otherwise would be to
overturn the outcomes in both the MCI and AT&T litigation and to cast
doubt on a wide swath of antitrust law that has nothing to do with the
essential facilities debate.
Of all the essential facilities cases discussed in this Part, Trinko posed
the least risk of forcing the court to act as a price-setting regulator. The
FCC had in fact already set the price for access. The pricing methodology, a form of long-run incremental cost, may have been controversial
and unremunerative to the incumbent local exchange carrier, 61 but no
court decision was required to set the price. While the regulatory setting
of the price below the needs or desires of the incumbent may have been
the real reason behind its alleged foot dragging in the first place, it does
not cut against the ability of the court to render and supervise the injunctive remedy sought by the plaintiff. The other non-price terms of
access were also already established by federal and state law and the private agreements between the parties negotiated pursuant to those laws.
Nothing in the request for damages would turn the court into a regulator. It would have perhaps involved a complex damage calculation,
depending on the final composition of the class of plaintiffs. However,
such a calculation would have been subject to the normal rules for the
use of expert witnesses, 64 and the general rules that allow estimates of
antitrust damages but not speculation. 65 More than likely, any permissible damage calculation would have been a before/after calculation depending on the period of violation or a comparison between the market
with the illegal conduct and a comparable market where no such illegal
behavior was found. 166 These are complicated calculations, to be sure.
However, they present nothing inherently regulatory or beyond the in162 The essential nature of wired local telephony within the meaning of the MCI test
may not continue indefinitely. We can envision a future where wired telephony no longer
constitutes infrastructure within the meaning of our proposal and the defendant in Trinko
would have no accompanying obligation to provide open access. This, however, suggests
that infrastructure theory is a sufficiently flexible instrument to determine whether certain platforms and networks have evolved into and out of infrastructure in the sense we
use the term.
163See Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 496 (2002); AT&T Corp. v. Iowa
Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 375 n.3, 393 (1999).
164See generallyKumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999); Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
165See Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555 (1931).
166 2

ABA
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stitutional capability of a district court to adjudicate or an appellate
court to review.
The injunctive remedy would have required the court to monitor
whether the defendant was granting access going forward on a nondiscriminatory basis. This would have required determining whether AT&T
was being treated less favorably in comparison to Verizon's own customers in terms of new orders and the like. But it is not clear why this is
beyond the powers of a diligent federal judge or why it would require
her to act like a regulator. It would not even necessarily require the kind
of elaborate reporting mechanism that the FCC and the New York State
regulator imposed on Verizon in their proceedings. The court may well
never have seen the litigants again, absent a suspected pattern of less
favorable treatment severe enough for the plaintiffs or the competing
providers to seek further court relief.
C.

ASSOCIATED

PREss

The 1945 Associated Press decision has always been one of the more
controversial antitrust decisions. 167 Most commentators generally cite it
rather grudgingly as a forebearer of the modern version of the essential
facilities doctrine,1 68 and most critics also seek to distinguish it on the
grounds that it involves a collective refusal to deal more analogous to a
group boycott. 169 We believe that the decision can best be understood in
terms of infrastructure theory, and that the Supreme Court acted properly and was indeed the only available institution to require a socially
beneficial regime of open access.
The Associated Press was a network of approximately 1200 newspapers that shared their reporters' local news stories with other AP newspapers, which would run all or portions of such distant stories as "wire"
stories in their own papers. In turn, those papers would share their own
local stories with any and all members of the far-flung network. The
Associated Press exhibited strong network effects, making membership
more and more valuable as more newspapers joined the arrangement.
The Department of Justice Antitrust Division eventually challenged
the bylaws of the Associated Press, which forbade the selling of AP news
items to non-members and which, as a practical matter, permitted an
existing member of the network to veto the membership of a competing
167United States v. Associated Press, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (Associated Press II).
168See, e.g., Lipsky & Sidak, supra note 21, at 1198.
169Id. at 1199-1200. The question of whether the essential facility is jointly or singly
controlled is irrelevant for infrastructure theory purposes. See supra Part II.
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newspaper. 70 The trial court granted the government's motion for summary judgment that the arrangement violated Section 1 of the Sherman
Act,17' and the Supreme Court, on direct appeal, affirmed.
Infrastructure theory suggests that the Supreme Court may have gotten it right where no other institution or regulator could have done
172
so.
The AP network satisfies each of the criteria for our economic theory of infrastructure. 73 The AP network is a sharable input. Unlike some
types of clubs (e.g., a gym or pool), AP membership provided access to
pooled resources (news stories) that grew in value as membership grew
and were not subject to congestion. The public and non-market value of
the AP network arises downstream through the productive use and dissemination of the news stories, which can be consumed non-rivalrously
or at least partially non-rivalrously, over a broad spectrum of demand.
One newspaper running an AP story does not affect the ability technically, practically, or commercially of another newspaper to use the same
or a different AP story.
The AP newswire is an input into two different downstream markets.
The first is that of the newspapers which used the ALP service to fill out
their daily newspaper with stories about locations where they themselves
did not have reporters available. The newspaper items (both AP and
locally produced) also were an input into the full range of productive,
artistic, and cultural activities of the readers of the paper. While the demand for the newspaper themselves can be fairly easily estimated and
produces relatively few spillovers, the same cannot be said for the newspaper readers. The contents of the AP stories may be consumed for pleasure and promptly forgotten or may be the basis for further research,
fiction, poetry, editorial comment, letters to the editor, community ac70

1 Alternative versions of the Justice Department's motivations in bringing the AP litigation can be found in SPENCER WEBER WALLER, THURMAN ARNOLD: A BioGRAPHY 102-05

(2005), and
TERSON

ALICE ALBRIGHT

HOGE, Cissy

PATTERSON: THE LIFE OF ELEANOR MEDILL PAT-

(1966).

171United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (Associated Press

I).
172 See Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 254 (1974) (distinguishing AP
case and discussing First Amendment prohibitions on requiring newspapers to carry editorial content).
173 Factual questions exist whether the Associated Press had true monopoly power, and
the government ultimately prevailed on a Section 1 restraint of trade theory. While clearly
the AP had no monopoly on news gathering itself and other news gathering networks
existed during the relevant time frame, the Court did find that 1179 out of the 1803 daily
English language newspapers with 35 million of the available 42 million circulation were
subject to the bylaws in question. Associated PressII, 326 U.S. at 9 n.4. Moreover, the other
existing news association also had restrictive membership conditions. These are all important and difficult factual issues, but not relevant to our consideration of whether the AP
constitutes infrastructure within the meaning of our theory.
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tion, making collages, and the whole range of commercial, social, artistic, and aesthetic production. Here the downstream spillovers are likely
significant yet quite difficult to measure.
The AP network thus constitutes infrastructure, and may justify a regime of open access to allow for the unleashing of the downstream spillovers that would otherwise be lost. Understood in these terms, the
Supreme Court's decision makes sense. A regime of open access grants
readers of all similarly situated newspapers access to the full range of
informational inputs. Granting access to competing newspapers to the
AP network is just a conduit for granting access to their readers to use
the informational inputs for the benefit of society as a whole. Perhaps
the district court in the AP case came closest to embodying our notion
of infrastructure when it opined: "[N] obody will maintain that, if AP
were the only news service in existence, the members could keep it
other papers to such news as they
wholly to themselves and reduce all
174
efforts."
own
their
by
gather
could
The courts were a perfectly appropriate institution to resolve this dispute and may well be the only institution capable of resolving it. The
size and nature of the AP network strongly suggests that no regulatory
regime could be created to administer this industry in a remotely efficient manner. It is not clear that such a regulatory regime would be
constitutional even if it could be created.
Furthermore, striking an overly restrictive bylaw is a traditional judicial function in a wide variety of areas of the law beyond antitrust, including corporate law and employment law (for example, by striking
restrictive covenants in employment contracts). Terms of access and
pricing were already established in the AP bylaws. Questions of free riding and incentives could be addressed through bylaw provisions restricting access to news stories generated locally and through requirements of
adding content to the network and not merely running stories produced
by others. Whether the new applicant was otherwise eligible for AP
membership, living up to membership requirements, and was being
granted reasonable nondiscriminatory access, become routine questions
of contract interpretation subject to any alternative dispute resolution
provision in the AP bylaws and/or judicial determination.

174Associated Press 1, 52 F. Supp. at 371. Similarly, Justice Frankfurter in his concurrence
raised, but did not pursue, the analogy between the AP and the notion of a public utility.
Associated Press II, 326 U.S. at 29.
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D.

MICROsoFr WINDOWS

Perhaps the most important, and the most complicated, example is
how our theory would apply to Windows, the ubiquitous Microsoft computer operating system. Although none of the major antitrust litigation
against Microsoft focused explicitly on this issue, we believe Windows
qualifies as the type of infrastructure that requires open access. 17 5 A
computer operating system is a vital input for all the commercial, creative, and public uses that computer users produce. The operating system
is the key to running any applications software, whether word processing, spreadsheet, Web browsing, music and video production and editing, computer-aided design, math and statistical packages, etc. The
downstream externalities for both software developers and individual
computer users are both immense and incalculable.
At a minimum, a regime of open access requires access to sufficient
information about Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) to allow
76
competing software application developers to interface with Windows.
However, if this is the limit of its obligation, then Microsoft has arguably
permitted open access to its infrastructure since it has always allowed
access to software application developers so outside companies could
write programs that run on Windows. 77 Microsoft is further subject to
additional disclosure and nondiscrimination provisions as a result of its
obligations under the antitrust consent decree it signed with the U.S.

175Whether the Microsoft Windows operating system is an essential facility within the
meaning of the traditional doctrine has been vigorously debated in the literature. Compare
Norman W. Hawker, Open Windows: The EssentialFacilities Doctrine and Microsoft, 25 OHIO
N.U. L. REv. 115 (1999), and Teague I. Donahey, Terminal Railroad Revisited: Using the
EssentialFacilitiesDoctrine to Ensure Accessibility to Internet Software Standards, 25 AIPLA Q.J.
277 (1997), and Mercer H. Harz, Dominance and Duty in the European Union: A Look Through
Microsoft Windows at the EssentialFacilitiesDoctrine, 11 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 189 (1997), with
Lipsky & Sidak, supra note 21, and Thomas F. Cotter, Intellectual Property and the Essential
FacilitiesDoctrine, 44 ANTITRUST BULL. 211 (1999).

176See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 53 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
Operating systems also function as platforms for software applications. They do
this by "exposing"-i.e., making available to software developers-routines or
protocols that perform certain widely-used functions. These are known as Application Programming Interfaces, or "APIs." For example, Windows contains an
API that enables users to draw a box on the screen. Software developers wishing
to include that function in an application need not duplicate it in their own
code. Instead, they can "call"-i.e., use-the Windows API. Windows contains
thousands of APIs, controlling everything from data storage to font display.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
177First & Gavil, supra note 143, at 693-94 (stating there was "virtually no proof at trial
that Microsoft had denied interoperability information to competitors").
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Commission
government and the competition decision of the European
7s
now affirmed by the European Court of First Instance.
Regardless of which specific remedy one favors, few would dispute the
infrastructural nature of Windows and similar software platforms. Thinking about Windows in these terms better explains why both the United
States and the European Union reached similar conclusions on the merits of their cases but also why the European Union went further in the
structure of its case and the open access remedies it sought. 179
E. IPoD-ITUNES
The antitrust issues with the popular iTunes music download service
and iPod MP3 music player are easy to state. The iPod is the dominant
portable MP3 music player, with an estimated market share of approximately 75 percent or more. 8 0 Apple's iTunes music store, which licenses
individual songs, albums, music videos, television shows, audio books,
podcasts, and movies for downloading to the user's home computer and
transfer onto their iPod MP3 players, does so in a way that only works on
iPods and not other manufacturers' music players. This limitation has
resulted in antitrust litigation in the United States"' and legislative ini178Commission Decision (EC) 53/2007 of 24 March 2004, Case COMP/C-3.37.792,
Microsoft, 2007 O.J. (L 32) 23, affid by Case T-201/04 R, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm'n, 2007
O.J. (C 269) 80. However, a regime of open access could also require the licensing of the
source code for Windows, a far more invasive licensing requirement that goes to the heart
of the different approaches that antitrust law and intellectual property bring to bear on
the questions of innovation and competition. So far no competition authority has required the licensing of source code and none is likely to do so. But see Hawker, supra note
175, at 140-41 (arguing for disclosure of source code to allow for actual integration of
competing software applications with Windows rather than mere disclosure of interface
information).
179 Compare United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001), and Final
Judgment, United States v. Microsoft Corp., Civil Action No. 98-1232 (CKK) (D.D.C. Nov.
12, 2002) (consent decree), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f200400/
200457.htm, with Commission Decision (EC) 53/2007 of 24 March 2004, Case COMP/C3.37.792, Microsoft, 2007 O.J. (L 32) 23, affd by Case T-201/04 R, Microsoft Corp. v.
Comm'n, 2007 O.J. (C 269) 80.
180Amanda Cantrell, Apple's Remarkable Comeback Story, CNNMONEY.COM, Mar. 29, 2006,
http://money.cnn.com/2006/03/29/technology/appleanniversary/?cnn'yes (estimating iPod market share at 73 percent); David Becker, It's All About the iPod, CNET
NEws.coM, Apr. 18, 2005, http://news.com.com/Its-all-about-the-iPod/2100-1041_35406519.html (estimating market share of hard drive music players at 92 percent); Ina
Fried, Apple Earnings Continue to Hum Along, CNET NEwS.COM, Apr. 14, 2005, http://
www.news.com/2102-1045-3-5669710.html?tag=ST.util.print (stating that February 2006
figures give the company a greater than 70 percent market share of all types of MP3
players, including more than 90 percent of the hard-drive market and 43 percent of the
flash market).
18'See, e.g., Slattery v. Apple Computer, Inc., No C 05-00037 JW, 2005 WL 2204981
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2005).
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tiatives in France and other countries to require interoperability. 182 Applying our simplifying assumptions that Apple is a true monopolist for
MP3 players, and that a provider of downloadable content cannot feasibly obtain access to the iPod or equivalent players,5 3 the question is
whether our theory of infrastructure would require a regime of open
access.
Our conclusion is no, or at least not yet. Even if iTunes is assumed to
be the bottleneck through which digital content flows for most portable
MP3 users, neither iTunes nor the iPod is yet an infrastructural asset for
the downstream commercial or creative activities of its owners. Rather,
iTunes is a content supplier, and the iPod is used primarily by consumers to enjoy music and increasingly other forms of content. iTunes and/
or the iPod could well develop into a ubiquitous portal through which
content is funneled to both personal computers and big-screen entertainment systems 184 used by consumers for commercial, public, social,
and other kinds of activities. However, this has not yet occurred and
does not appear to be the case for the foreseeable future. As a result,
neither iTunes nor the iPod device itself has yet become the kind of
platform monopoly that generates the massive, but difficult to measure,
downstream externalities that are the key to our vision of infrastructure
and the resulting requirement of open access.
F.

EUROPEAN UNION CASES

The European Union has also explored the issues of open access in
competition law in a variety of frameworks within the European Commission and in the courts. We believe it has handled the issues of infrastructure, essential facilities, open access, and competition law liability
in a more consistent and explicit way than the U.S. courts in recognizing
the importance of infrastructure when deciding questions of open access in its regulatory and competition policy. The essential facilities doctrine has been adopted by both the European Commission by name and
the European Court of First Instance and Court ofJustice in practice. It
is one form of an abuse of a dominant position that is barred by Article
82 of the Treaty of European Union. 8 5 There are certain doctrinal rea182Associated Press, French Law Seeks Interoperability, WIRED, Mar. 17, 2006, http://
www.wired.com/print/politics/law/news/2006/03/70436. But see Thomas Crampton, Apple Gets French Support in Music Compatibility Case, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2006, at C9, available
at www.nyimes.com/2006/07/28/business/28cnd-music.html?ei'5088&en'a4590cf789.
183This is not actually the case in the real world where MP3 players have access to
competing music download services and vice versa.
184See iPod and iPhone: TV Out Support, APPLE.COM, Nov. 14, 2007, http://
docs.info.apple.com/article.html?armum=300233.
185 Article 82 states:
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sons unique to EU competition law why the essential facilities doctrine is
more expansive in the European Union than in the United States.1 86 But
for purposes of this article, we focus only on the EU use of the doctrine
as it illustrates the utility of the infrastructure theory we are advocating.
1. TraditionalInfrastructure
The essential facilities doctrine has been applied to a variety of infrastructure-type settings in the European Union, and has proved particuprovision
larly useful in conjunction with Article 86 of the EU Treaty, a 187
applying the EU competition rules to public sector restraints.
In the easy cases where the supply-side criteria reflected in the MCI
test were readily satisfied and the facility in question was infrastructural,
the European Commission imposed liability, using the essential facilities
doctrine by name, when the operator of a port or harbor used its control of that facility to discriminate against a competitor for ferry service
or shipping services by denying access to needed berths to competi-

Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common
market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States.
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other
unfair trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of
consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
Article 82, EU Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1, available at
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/en/treaties/dat/11992M/htm/11992M.html.
186Although beyond the scope of this article, the full scope of EU competition law in
this area and the doctrinal differences with the United States are discussed more fully in
LENNART RITTER & W. DAVID BRAUN, EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAw: A PRACTITIONER'S
GUIDE

477-81 (3d ed. 2004); RdCHARD WHISH, COMPETITION LAW 653-732 (5th ed. 2003);
R. ATWOOD ET AL., ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD § 16 (3d ed. 1997);

2JAMES

Gitter, A Call for Legislative Clarification, supra note 75, at 227-40; Harz, supra note 175, at
225-26;John Temple Lang, Defining Legitimate Competition: Companies'Dutiesto Supply Competitors and Access to Essential Facilities, 18 FoRDHAm INT'L L.J. 437, 475-83 (1994).
187In contrast, U.S. antitrust principles generally do not apply to restraints on competition imposed by federal, state, or local governments. For arguments that the EU approach
is superior in this regard, see Spencer Weber Waller, Bringing Globalism Home: Lessonsfrom
Antitrust and Beyond, 32 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 113, 118-24 (2000); Diane P. Wood, United States

Antitrust Law in the Global Market, 1 IND. J.

GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.

409 (1994).
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tors.' 8s For example, the European Commission imposed antitrust liability on a port operator that also operated a ferry service in such a manner
to prevent either existing or new entrants from competing with its ferry
service. In so doing, the Commission stated:
A dominant undertaking which both owns or controls and itself uses
an essential facility, i.e., a facility or infrastructure, without access to
which competitors cannot provide services to their customers, and
which refuses its competitors access to that facility or grants access to
competitors only on terms less favorable than those which it gives its
own services, thereby placing the competitors at a competitive disadvantage, infringes Article
86 [now Article 82], if the other conditions
89
of that Article are met.
Similarly, the Commission has applied the essential facilities to telecommunications systems, electrical grids, tunnels, airport ground handling
services, oil and gas pipelines, certain payment systems, interactive cable
television boxes, airline interlining agreements, and computerized airline reservation systems. 90
2. Easy Networks Cases

The European Union has also had a series of relatively easy cases
where challengers sought access to networks where it would be difficult
to justify access on either traditional essential facilities or infrastructure
grounds. The European Court ofJustice (ECJ) quite properly refused to
require the leading newspaper in Austria to make its delivery network
available to a smaller competitor that was, legally and practically speaking, free to create its own network. 19' In Oscar Bronner, the ECJ rejected
the essential facilities claim on the grounds that the plaintiff could use
188See Case IV/34.174, B&I Line PLC v. Sealink Harbours Ltd. & Sealink Stena Ltd., 5
C.M.L.R. 255 (1992); Commission Decision (EC) No. 94/19, Sea Containers v. Stena
Sealink, 1994 O.J. (L 15) 8; Commission Decision (EC) No. 94/119, Port of Rodby, 1994
O.J. (L 55) 52; Commission Decision (EC) No. 354/66, Eurotunnel, 1994 O.J (L 354) 66.
See generally Arwoon ET AL., supra note 186, at § 16.4.
189B&I Line PLC, 5 C.M.L.R. at 265; Sea Containers, 1994 O.J. (L 15) at 16.
190Commission Decision (EEC) No. 88/589, London European Airways PLC v.
Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 1988 O.J. (L 317) 47, 1989 4 C.M.L.R. 662. But seeJoined
Cases T-374, T-375, T-384 & T-388/94, European Night Servs. Ltd. v. Comm'n, 1998
E.C.R. 11-3141 (annulling Commission's access requirement on grounds of no showing of
indispensable nature of access). See also Commission Notice on the Application of the
Competition Rules to Access Agreements in the Telecommunications Sector, 1998 O.J. (C
265) 2; Council Directive (EEC) No. 90/547 of 29 Oct. 1990, On the Transit of Electricity
through Transmission Grids, 1990 O.J. (L 313) 30. See generally WHISH, supra note 186, at
675-76; Lang, supra note 186; DG Competition DiscussionPaper on the Application of Article 82
of the Treaty to ExclusionaryAbuses 9 (Dec. 2005), available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/
competition/antitrust/art82/discpaper2005.pdf.
191Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. v. Mediaprint Zeitungs, 1998 E.C.R. 17791, 4 C.M.L.R. 112 (1999).
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or create any number of alternative distribution systems for its newspaper, ranging from mail delivery to the use of kiosks, vending machines,
and retail stores. The ECJ also relied on the fact that were no technical,
legal, or economic obstacles to creating an additional national92 delivery
system either on its own or in concert with other publishers.
The European Commission and the European Court of First Instance
(CFI) also rejected extending the essential facilities doctrine in Tierce
Ladbroke SA v. Commission.193 In Ladbroke, a leading Belgian betting parlor
that took bets on horse races throughout Europe sought access to televised pictures and audio commentary of French horse races. The firms
that held the exclusive rights to such broadcasts refused to license Ladbroke, which then complained to the European Commission alleging a
breach of Article 82 of the EU Treaty. The Commission rejected the
complaint without even issuing a formal opinion and Ladbroke appealed to the CFI. 194 The CFI readily disposed of the essential facilities
aspects of the case in holding that the broadcast rights were in no sense
essential for the conduct of the petitioner's wagering business. 195
Both Bronner and Ladbroke are easy cases under traditional and infrastructure versions of the essential facilities doctrine. Neither facility was
"essential" in any normal sense of the word. Moreover, Bronner raised
serious free-riding concerns. Both facilities also fail as infrastructure.
There is no indication that demand for the distribution network in Bronner, and the racing broadcasts in Ladbroke, were driven by the downstream productive activities of the users. In the case of Ladbroke, there
further appeared to be no downstream productive activities at all, only
the consumption of the broadcasts by betting patrons.
3. Application in Extraordinary Circumstances to IP
In the harder cases involving overly broad intellectual property
rights-where the supply side issues become complicated and the infrastructural nature of the facilities in question is more difficult to establish- 196 the European Court of Justice has left open the possibility of
1924 C.M.L.R. at 145. See also Case C-552/03P, Unilever Bestfoods (Ireland) Ltd. v.
Comm'n, 2006 E.C.R. 1-9091, 137, 5 C.M.L.R. 27 (2006) (affirming liability for exclusive
supply arrangement that foreclosed competitors, but rejecting essential facility claims, citing Bronner).
193Case T-504/93, 1997 E.C.R. 11-923, 5 C.M.L.R. 309 (1997).
194 See Valentine Korah, Comment, The Ladbroke Saga, 19 EUR. COMp. L. REv. 169
(1998).
195 Tierce Ladbroke, 1997 E.C.R.
10, 5 C.M.L.R. at 343.
196 See Frischmann & Lemley, Spillovers, supra note 3, at 282-84.
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liability in extraordinary circumstances. 97 An important consideration
in the European cases involving intellectual property rights was the fact
that in both cases the intellectual property rights were quite broad in
scope and somewhat controversial as to whether they should have existed at all.'
a. Magill
In the case known as Magill, an Irish publisher of television guides
had sought to license copyrighted program information listings from
the three stations that broadcast the programming and published their
own individual program guides. 9 9 The European Court of Justice upheld the determination of both the European Commission and the
Court of First Instance that the stations had abused their dominant position in the copyrighted program listings, albeit without referring to the
essential facilities doctrine. 0 The ECJ held that the refusal to license
was unlawful where the respondents had prevented the appearance of a
new product (a combined weekly program guide) for which there was a
"specific, constant and regular potential demand" and where the re20
spondents had reserved for themselves the secondary market. '
We think Magill is debatable under infrastructure theory. Consumption of the programming listings and the television programs themselves
is non-rivalrous. One reader's or viewer's enjoyment does not limit another's access. The programming listings are an intermediate good or
service to the viewing of the programs themselves. It is the facilitation of
the viewing of the programs and their content of the programs that arguably is the basis for a wide range of commercial, public, and social
uses by the viewers in the same manner as reading a newspaper or accessing the Internet. The ECJ's requirement that the defendant denied access in a manner that prevented the appearance of a new product for
which there was measurable demand is an inelegant surrogate for the
97

1 Joined Cases C-241 & C-242/91, Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) v. Comm'n, 1995
E.C.R. 1-743, 4 C.M.L.R. 718 (1995) (Magill); Case C 418/01, IMS Health GmbH & Co. v.
NDC Health GmbH & Co., 2004 E.C.R. 1-5039, 4 C.M.L.R. 28 (2004).
198For example, in Magill, the listings of televised program information (the essential
facility in question) were protected by an unusual national copyright system not followed
in most countries. In the IMS case, the data structures were also protected by German
intellectual property rights not found in most other countries.
M Magill 1995 E.C.R. 1-743, 4 C.M.L.R. 718 (1995).
2o This omission coupled with the ECJ's discussion of the respondents' lack of business justification, id. at 1-824, 4 C.M.L.R. at 791, appears to draw heavily on the U.S. Supreme Court's approach in Aspen Skiing decision.
20' Magill, 1995 E.C.R. at 1-824, 4 C.M.L.R. at 791.
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presence of downstream spillovers that justifies a regime of open access
in the first place.
b. IMS
The hardest case to justify in terms of our theory is the IMS case.20 2 In
IMS, the ECJ confronted a refusal to license situation, in which the challenger wanted access to the incumbent's intellectual property in order
to compete with the incumbent in the primary market itself. Not surprisingly, this is the most controversial of the EU cases on the subject. 203 In
IMS, the respondent provided sales data that pharmaceutical companies
used in marketing their products in such a way that did not violate German privacy law. In essence, IMS aggregated sales data covering four or
five different pharmacies, which was the narrowest geographic grouping
possible, while still lawfully protecting patient anonymity. Two new entrants entered the market in the early 1990s and found they could not
sell to customers with any different data structures. When they began to
use the so-called "brick structure" of the respondent, IMS sued them for
copyright infringement and obtained an injunction. Following a convoluted procedural history,2 0 4 the case reached the European Court ofJustice for a preliminary ruling 20 5 on whether IMS's refusal to license the
data brick structure could in principle violate EU competition law.
2

Case C 418/01, IMS Health GmbH & Co. v. NDC Health GmbH & Co., 2004 E.C.R.
1-5039, 4 C.M.L.R. 28 (2004). See also IMS Health GmbH & Co. v. NDC Health GmbH &
Co., 2004 E.C.R. 1-5039, 2004 WL 586494 (opinion of Mr. Advocate General Tizzano)
[hereinafter Tizzano Opinion].
203 See Kenneth Glazer, The IMS Health Case: A U.S. Perspective,13 GEO. MASON L. REV.
1197 (2006); Melanie J. Reichenberger, The Role of Compulsory Licensing in UnilateralRefusals to Deal: Have the United States andEuropean Approaches Grown FurtherApart After IMS ?,31
J. CORP. L. 549 (2006); Ritter, supranote 93; Thomas Eilmansberger, The EssentialFacilities
Doctrine Under Article 82: What is the State of Affairs After IMS Health and Microsoft, 16
KING'S COLL. L.J. 329 (2005); Christian Ahlborn et al., The Logic and Limits of the "Exceptional Circumstances Test" in Magill and IMS Health, 28 FORtHAM INT'L LJ. 1109 (2005);
Turney, supra note 73; Donna M. Gitter, Strong Medicine for Competition Ills: TheJudgraentof
the European Court ofJustice in the IMS Health Action and its Implicationsfor Microsoft Corporation, 15 DUKEJ. COMp. & INT'L L. 153 (2004); Stbastien J. Evrard, EssentialFacilities in the
European Union:Bronner and Beyond, 10 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 491 (2004); Pitofsky, Patterson
& Hooks, supra note 6; Marquardt & Leddy, supra note 21; Gitter, A Call for Legislative
Clarification,supra note 75; Frank Fine, NDC/IMS: A Logical Application of EssentialFacilities
Doctrine,23 EUR. COMP. L. REv. 457 (2002).
204 For a procedural history of the case see Tizzano Opinion, supra note 202,
1-27.
205 Under Article 234 of the Treaty on European Union, courts in EU Member States
have the option, and in some cases the duty, to refer questions of EU law to the European
Court ofJustice for a preliminary ruling. The preliminary ruling is a definitive interpretation of EU law but does not apply the ruling of law to the facts of the case, or otherwise
decide the case, which is resolved on remand to the national court. See Consolidated
Versions of the Treaty on European Union and of the Treaty Establishing the European
Community, art. 234, consolidated on Dec. 29, 2006, 2006 O.J. (C 321 E) 1, available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:SOM:EN:HTML.
20
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The ECJ reiterated its previous holdings that in "exceptional circumstances" a refusal to license intellectual property rights could violate EU
competition law. 20 6 The court built on its reasoning in the Magill and
Oscar Bronner cases. It held that the issue for the national court on remand was whether the copyrighted data structure was essential in the
sense that a new entrant of comparable size as the respondent could not
produce a similar facility in an economically viable manner and that the
denial of access prevented the creation of a new product or service for
which there was consumer demand. 20 7 The ECJ further held that the
national court should consider in making this determination the fact
that the data structure had been created as an industry standard with
the help of the customers (that provided the data).208
The IMS decision may be defensible because of the overly broad
scope of the intellectual property at issue, violations of the customary
rights of access to industry standards, or under other doctrines of EU
competition law, but it is a poor fit from the perspective of infrastructure theory. The brick structure-aggregated and anonymous group
pharmacy sales data-does not seem to meet the criteria for even commercial infrastructure, 20 9 and in particular seems unlikely to involve any
of the demand side problems or produce any of the downstream spill210
overs that would produce the economic justification for open access.
4. Synthesizing the EU Cases
While the EU cases are often dry and undertheorized,2 1' they seem
(with the possible exception of IMS) to instinctively understand the
206

IMS Health GmbH & Co., 4 C.M.L.R. at 35.

207

Id. at 31-52.
Id. at RI.

208

209 See supra Part II.A.
210

The case for treatment as infrastructure would be strengthened if the pharmaceutical companies used the data as an input in their research and development efforts, but
this does not appear to be the case.
211 The typical opinion in all areas of the law consists of a long recitation of the facts,
the proceedings below, the questions presented, and the positions of the parties followed
by a short statement of the outcome of the case without significant analysis. This aspect of
EU jurisprudence is probably a compromise result of the mixture of common law and
civil law traditions of the judge represented on the European Court of First Instance and
the European Court of Justice, as well as the fact that the opinions of these courts are
both anonymous and unanimous.
The opinion of the Advocate General typically is the one part of an EU court opinion
with any significant analysis. The Advocate General is a position with no direct analogue
in U.S. law. The Advocate General is a member of the European Court ofJustice and the
Court of First Instance who does not vote or participate in the decision itself but renders
an opinion prior to the decision to assist the members of the court deciding the matter.
The closest, but still highly imperfect, analogy would be if the Solicitor General of the
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value of the essential facilities doctrine when applied to infrastructural
assets, both physical and incorporeal. Overall, the European Commission and courts have both applied the doctrine and refrained from doing so in a sensible administrable way that has not embroiled these
institutions in remedies beyond their competence. They began with classic infrastructural assets and further required that the facility be an input in some downstream market. As with the jurisprudence of the U.S.
courts in this area, infrastructure theory can help describe and organize
what the European Union has done in this area and suggest where they
have succeeded and could have done better. The limited, but principled, approach of the European Union in dealing with the essential facility doctrine in its own terms also points the way for the United States
to reclaim a theory of liability that it pioneered, yet disdained more
recently.
VII. CONCLUSION: RELYING ON ANTITRUST TO
GET IT RIGHT
The debate over the merits of private control over various types of
resources is ongoing in many different areas of the law, from intellectual
property to communications law. Many of these areas depend heavily
upon antitrust law to regulate and sustain competition in the relevant
or input
industries. Competitive markets are a foundational component
212
into the systems that these other areas of the law regulate.
A common refrain in these debates is that government regulation is
unnecessary to ensure desirable public access to infrastructural resources because antitrust law will provide a sufficient means for regulating the exclusionary conduct of infrastructure providers. 213 This argument was present in virtually every historical and modern day battle over
deregulation. 214 The frequent reliance on this justification makes it even
more important that antitrust law get it right.
United States participated as an amicus curiae in every case. See generallyLINCOLN CAPLAN,
THE TENTH JUSTICE: THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE RULE OF LAW (1987) (explaining
historical and contemporary role of Solicitor General's office).
212 For example, intellectual property laws strike a balance between access and exclusion with significant reliance on the premise that competitive markets are the baseline
from which some deviation is needed.
213 In some cases, private parties will provide such access voluntarily because it will be
in their interest to do so (on a theory that infrastructure providers will recognize when
open access increases the social value of their infrastructure and will attempt to internalize complementary efficiencies). See Farrell & Weiser, supra note 39, at Part III.
214 See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text. Cf Yoo, supra note 76; Atkinson &
Weiser, supra note 76; Weiser, Toward A Next Generation Regulatory Strategy, supra note 76
(making similar arguments in current controversy over network neutrality and Internet
regulation).
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Revitalizing the essential facilities doctrine is more than just preventing well-meaning critics from throwing out the baby with the bath water,
or preventing more self-interested parties from jettisoning another legal
barrier to anticompetitive rent seeking. 215 We offer instead an economically based model that suggests that for certain carefully defined types of
infrastructure, society as a whole benefits from a regime of open access.
Our theory would both expand and contract the traditional essential
facilities doctrine in antitrust law. Our test would create an infrastructure screen before applying the traditional MCI test for most commercial infrastructure cases. At the same time, an infrastructure theory of
essential facilities would cover a broader spectrum of public, social, and
mixed infrastructure under a regime of open access. Antitrust liability
would ensue if, and only if, a defendant used the denial of access to
infrastructure to maintain or acquire (or attempt to acquire) monopoly
power in a relevant market.
Defining the essential facilities doctrine in this manner would create a
limited but powerful tool for courts and other institutions to determine
rights of access and the legal liabilities for the denial of that access. It
also would reconnect the more narrow debates in antitrust to a broader
set of debates about the nature of property and open access, and provide for a regime that better mediates the tension between two very different visions for law and society.

215 See e.g., John Thorne, A CategoricalRule Limiting Section 2 of the Sherman Act, Verizon
v. Trinko, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 289 (2005) (Deputy General Counsel of Verizon applauding
result in Trinko litigation).
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